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This Essay explores how civil courts function as sites of racial
capitalism. The racial capitalism conceptual framework posits that
capitalism requires racial inequality and relies on racialized systems of
expropriation to produce capital. While often associated with traditional
economic systems, racial capitalism applies equally to nonmarket settings,
including civil courts.
The lens of racial capitalism enriches access to justice scholarship by
explaining how and why state civil courts subordinate racialized groups
and individuals. Civil cases are often framed as voluntary disputes
among private parties, yet many racially and economically marginalized
litigants enter the civil legal system involuntarily, and the state plays a
central role in their subordination through its judicial arm. A major
function of the civil courts is to transfer assets from these individual
defendants to corporations or the state itself. The courts accomplish this
through racialized devaluation, commodification, extraction, and
dispossession.
Using consumer debt collection as a case study, we illustrate how
civil court practices facilitate and enforce racial capitalism. Courts forgo
procedural requirements in favor of speedy proceedings and default
judgments, even when fraudulent practices are at play. The debt spiral
example, along with others from eviction and child support cases,
highlights how civil courts normalize, legitimize, and perpetuate the
extraction of resources from poor, predominately Black communities and
support the accumulation of white wealth.
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between race and civil courts has been understudied
and undertheorized. Those who research and practice in those courts—
and certainly those individuals who are subjected to them—have long
been aware of the pervasive influence of race. Yet the myriad ways in which
race influences the operation, structure, and design of civil courts require
far more attention in the scholarly literature. This need is particularly
acute in the case of state civil courts, where most civil cases are litigated.1
While the dearth of race-based data from state civil courts has made it
diﬃcult to construct a full picture, existing data show that racialized
individuals and communities are impacted disproportionately by civil
justice issues.2 Racialized litigants are less likely to have access to critical
1. Daniel Wilf-Townsend, Assembly-Line Plaintiﬀs, 135 Harv. L. Rev. 1704, 1715–16
(2022).
2. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to Civil Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality, 34 Ann. Rev. Soc. 339, 349–50 (2008) [hereinafter Sandefur, Access to Civil Justice].
Although there is relatively little scholarship focusing on the influence of race on the civil
legal system as a whole, several scholarly works have taken an in-depth look at the influence
of race in a particular legal context. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Shattered Bonds: The
Color of Child Welfare 267–76 (2002) [hereinafter Roberts, Shattered Bonds]; Tonya L.
Brito, David J. Pate, Jr., & Jia-Hui Stefanie Wong, “I Do for My Kids”: Negotiating Race and
Racial Inequality in Family Court, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 3027, 3027–30 (2015) [hereinafter
Brito et al., I Do for My Kids]; Peter Hepburn, Renee Louis & Matthew Desmond, Racial
and Gender Disparities Among Evicted Americans, 7 Socio. Sci. 649, 653–56 (2020); Richard
Lempert & Karl Monsma, Cultural Diﬀerences and Discrimination: Samoans Before a
Public Housing Eviction Board, 59 Am. Soc. Rev. 890, 894–905 (1994); Kathryn A. Sabbeth,
Housing Defense as the New Gideon, 41 Harv. J.L. & Gender 55, 89, 95–96 (2018)
[hereinafter Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon] (arguing that creation of a right
to eviction defense counsel promotes race and gender equality); Paul Keil & Annie
Waldman, The Color of Debt: How Collection Suits Squeeze Black Neighborhoods,
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resources and more likely to receive negative results.3 And, as in all
systems, the ability to access justice in the civil legal system is influenced by
multiple factors, including societal discrimination, economic inequality,
and race-based behaviors of individual system actors.4 The civil court
system is characterized by racial disparities in access, treatment, and
outcomes, all of which deserve increased attention. At the same time, we
view the observation of these disparities as the beginning of a larger and
sustained inquiry about how and why such disparities exist. Racial
disparities in the civil courts serve as a miner’s canary—an invitation to
further question the role that race plays in the design, structure, and
operation of the civil court system.5 The responses to that inquiry are
critical not only to our understanding of how race aﬀects the
administration of civil justice, but also as part of a necessary foundation
for contemplating systemic change.
This Essay contributes to the above conversation—and oﬀers one
possible response to the above inquiry—by exploring how civil courts, as
an arm of the state, function as sites of racial capitalism. It argues that
theories of racial capitalism help to explain how and why state civil courts
are designed and operate to subordinate racialized groups and
individuals. In doing so, it also makes an important contribution to the
growing racial capitalism literature by expanding its application in legal
scholarship. This Essay strengthens the existing literature by examining
the racial capitalism conceptual framework in state civil courts, a site
commonly understood as nonmarket.6 More broadly, it advances still
nascent conversations about race and access to civil justice that require not

ProPublica (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/debt-collection-lawsuitssqueeze-black-neighborhoods [https://perma.cc/DW2R-Y782] (exploring an in-depth
study that highlights the disproportionate frequency of debt collection lawsuits in black
neighborhoods); see also Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Eviction Courts, 18 U. St. Thomas L.J. 359,
368–71 (2022) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Sabbeth, Eviction Courts]
(describing why eviction disproportionately impacts people of color); Kathryn A. Sabbeth
& Jessica K. Steinberg, The Gender of Gideon, 69 UCLA L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 13–34), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3807349 [https://perma.cc/55SF-878F]
(summarizing empirical literature on women of color facing eviction, debt, and family law
matters).
3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra Part I; see also Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Market-Based Law Development, LPE
Project: L. & Pol. Econ. Blog (July 21, 2021), https://lpeproject.org/blog/market-basedlaw-development/ [https://perma.cc/WXE6-BKWG] [hereinafter Sabbeth, Market-Based
Law Development] (arguing that access to the system is based on capital).
5. See Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, The Miner’s Canary 11 (2002) (“Those who are
racially marginalized are like the miner’s canary: their distress is the first sign of a danger
that threatens us all.”).
6. See Angela P. Harris, Foreword: Racial Capitalism and Law, in Histories of Racial
Capitalism vii, xi (Destin Jenkins & Justice Leroy eds., 2021) [hereinafter Harris, Foreword]
(distinguishing “government” and sources of state power (such as courts) from governance
exercised by economic markets).
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only more empirical data on racial demographics but also more
theoretical analysis of the social significance of race.
Racial capitalism is a relatively new concept in legal academia and has
its roots in several other disciplines, including Black studies, history,
political science, sociology, and cultural studies, where the term has been
defined and used diﬀerently by a wide range of scholars.7 While critical
race theorists have demonstrated that race is fundamental to and deeply
embedded in U.S. law,8 scholars of racial capitalism have emphasized how
racial subordination is fundamental, rather than incidental, to economic
exploitation.9 From a legal perspective, racial capitalism can be
understood as a system of racialized “dispossession, extraction,
accumulation, and exploitation” for power and profit in which human
elements are both commodified and devalued.10 We argue that through
their interpretation and implementation of the law and the processes they
impose, the civil courts function as instruments of racial capitalism,
facilitating its goals and assisting in its entrenchment.
Civil cases are typically framed as voluntary disputes among private
parties, yet many racially and economically marginalized litigants,
particularly Black individuals, enter the civil legal system involuntarily,
often in a defensive or vulnerable posture.11 Even in cases where
marginalized plaintiﬀs initiate litigation, they enter the civil courts due to
a lack of other feasible options. They are forced to subject themselves and
others to a system designed to devalue them, commodify their needs, and
maximize financial extraction. Most of the cases in the civil system involve
eviction, debt collection, or family law matters12—legal matters likely to
7. Michael Ralph & Maya Singhal, Racial Capitalism, 48 Theory & Soc’y 851, 851–74
(2019).
8. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518 (1980); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law,
101 Harv. L Rev. 1331, 1348, 1370–72 (1988) (emphasizing that racism is formally
entrenched in U.S. law and plays a “hegemonic” role in the institutional oppression of Black
people).
9. See, e.g., Cedric J. Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition 9–10 (3d ed. 2020) (illuminating that “the nonobjective character of capitalist development” exists at the intersection of racism and economic exploitation).
10. See Harris, Foreword, supra note 6, at vii.
11. See Sabbeth & Steinberg, supra note 2, at 10–11; Colleen F. Shanahan, Jessica K.
Steinberg, Alyx Mark & Anna E. Carpenter, The Institutional Mismatch of State Civil Courts,
122 Colum. L. Rev. 1471, 1478–87 (2022) [hereinafter Shanahan et al., Institutional
Mismatch].
12. See Sabbeth & Steinberg, supra note 2, at 10 (“The civil courts churn through 20
million cases per year, most of which are evictions, debt collections, and family law matters
of all types—divorce, custody, child support, parental rights, and domestic violence.”);
Paula Hannaford-Agor, Scott Graves & Shelley Spacek Miller, Civil Justice Initiative, The
Landscape of Civil Litigation in State Courts, Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts., 17, 19 (2015),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/13376/civiljusticereport-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9AJ3-TN84] (noting that almost two-thirds of state civil court caseloads
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target poor and racialized litigants.13 And in many of those cases, an
individual has been sued by the state or a corporation.14 It is those cases
that are the focus of this Essay, where the ability of the party initiating court
action to extract capital and exercise control over racialized people is
strongest. And it is in these cases that the role of the courts in facilitating
the transfer and accumulation of assets from racialized individuals to
majority-white corporations or the state itself is most visible.
Courts have long played a role in defining race and policing racial
order, contributing to the perpetuation of racial inequality and, more
specifically, white dominance.15 The civil courts that are the focus of this
Essay are very much a part of that story. They oversee and process case
consist of contract cases and that, of those, the large majority are debt collection and
landlord–tenant cases); see also Wilf-Townsend, supra note 1, at 1717.
13. See, e.g., Brito et al., I Do for My Kids, supra note 2, at 3029–30 (describing the
predominance of Black male defendants in child support cases); Vicki Lens, Judging the
Other: The Intersection of Race, Gender, and Class in Family Court, 57 Fam. Ct. Rev. 72, 73
(2019) (noting the disproportionate representation of African Americans in the child welfare system and how institutional factors exacerbate the hardships experienced by poor
Black families); Andrew Roesch-Knapp, The Cyclical Nature of Poverty: Evicting the Poor,
45 Law & Soc. Inquiry 839, 852 (2020) (citing Matthew Desmond, Weihua An, Richelle
Winkler & Thomas Ferriss, Evicting Children, 92 Soc. Forces 303, 303–27 (2013)) (noting
that “black tenants have a significantly higher likelihood of receiving an eviction notice
than white tenants”); Wilf-Townsend, supra note 1, at 1750–51 (noting the disproportionate
impact of debt collection and eviction cases on communities of color); see also Sabbeth,
Housing Defense as the New Gideon, supra note 2, at 89–96 (highlighting that eviction disproportionately impacts Black women). For more on the impact of the child welfare system
on Black communities, see infra note 41 and accompanying text (various sources describing
impact of child welfare system on Black communities).
14. See Wilf-Townsend, supra note 1, at 1711 (“[I]n state courts . . . the most common
cases pit a better-resourced plaintiﬀ, often a corporation with lawyers, against an unrepresented individual defendant.”); id. at 1724 (“[T]he majority of civil cases pit a business
plaintiﬀ against a natural person defendant, often in a contract dispute involving an alleged
debt.”). In the eviction context, several recent studies have evidenced the dominance of
large, corporate landlords and their relative likelihood to file for eviction. See Henry
Gomory, The Social and Institutional Contexts Underlying Landlords’ Eviction Practices,
Soc. Forces, June 16, 2021, at 1, 2–3 (finding that corporate landlords are two-to-three times
more likely than non-corporate landlords to file for evictions); Elora Lee Raymond, Richard
Duckworth, Benjamin Miller, Michael Lucas & Shiraj Pokharel, From Foreclosure to Eviction: Housing Insecurity in Corporate-Owned Single-Family Rentals, 20 Cityscape 159, 162
(2018) (showing that “[l]arge corporate owners in the single-family rental business are 68
percent more likely than small landlords to evict tenants”); Devin Q. Rutan & Matthew
Desmond, The Concentrated Geography of Eviction, 693 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci.
64, 65, 76–78 (2021) (noting that a small number of large landlords were found to be
responsible for a significant percentage of all evictions in 17 cities).
15. See, e.g., Ian Haney López, White By Law: The Legal Construction of Race (1996)
(“[T]he courts were responsible for deciding not only who was White, but why someone was
White. Thus, the courts had to wrestle in their decisions with the nature of race in general
and of White racial identity in particular.”); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of
Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 Yale L.J. 109, 112–14 (1998)
(“[The] law, broadly defined, played an important role in constituting the cultural meaning
of racial identities. . . . [In] the antebellum period, law made the ‘performance’ of whiteness
increasingly important to the determination of racial status.”).

1248

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1243

dockets filled by poor people and, as limited available data have shown,
disproportionately Black people.16 In addition, the racialization of poverty
in U.S. society has made it impossible to disentangle narratives of the
“undeserving poor” from those of Black America.17 This entwinement of
racial and economic status—and the imposition of beliefs and traits
suggesting that these individuals are appropriate subjects for statesponsored discipline18—is operationalized through the work of civil courts
and provides additional justification for the extraction that racial
capitalism requires.
The courts administering these cases are often characterized by mass
adjudication, speed, and a lack of procedural protections.19 The systematic
and low-cost way in which these civil courts process cases—devaluing and
commodifying the individuals subject to them and disregarding their procedural and substantive rights—contributes to the narrative that these
individuals are not worthy of the justice system that society upholds as the
ideal. Instead, the courts interpret and apply law and procedure in ways
that facilitate and maintain a racialized underclass that can be used to generate profit for dominant individuals and corporations.20 In doing so,
courts normalize, legitimize, and perpetuate a system of racial
16. While we acknowledge that matters handled by the civil courts harm people of all
races—and marginalized communities in particular—the literature has highlighted the particular harm committed in Black communities. See, e.g., Benjamin F. Teresa, The
Geography of Eviction in Richmond: Beyond Poverty, RVA Eviction Lab 1,
https://cura.vcu.edu/media/cura/pdfs/cura-documents/GeographiesofEviction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W8LE-6H6G] (observing the correlation between the share of African
American population and eviction rate); Raymond et al., supra note 14, at 16 (demonstrating that the highest levels of eviction filings in Atlanta are in “predominantly black
neighborhoods”); Wilf-Townsend, supra note 1, at 1750 (noting the high rates of default
judgments in debt collection cases in Black (and Latinx) neighborhoods); Keil & Waldman,
supra note 2.
17. See, e.g., Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War
on Poverty 9 (1994); Martin Gilens, How the Poor Became Black: The Racialization of Poverty in the Mass Media, in Race and the Politics of Welfare Reform 101, 101–02 (Sanford S.
Schram, Joe Soss & Richard S. Fording eds., 2003) (describing the entwinement of race and
poverty and the “association of African Americans with the ‘undeserving poor’”); john a.
powell, The Race and Class Nexus: An Intersectional Perspective, 25 Law & Ineq. 355, 396
(2007) (“Race and class are mutually constitutive.”).
18. Cf. Kaaryn S. Gustafson, Cheating Welfare: Public Assistance and the Criminalization of Poverty 1–2 (2011); Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race,
Poverty, and Support, 25 Yale J.L. & Feminism 317, 336 (2014) (describing use of the
“hyperregulatory state” to control and subordinate people targeted by race, class, place, and
gender); see also Joe Soss, Richard C. Fording & Sanford F. Schram, Disciplining the Poor:
Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of Race 2–3 (2011).
19. See infra Part III; see also Sabbeth, Eviction Courts, supra note 2, at 376–85
(describing the speed and volume of eviction case dispositions and the lack of procedural
protections available to tenants); Wilf-Townsend, supra note 1, at 1716–23 (describing the
high-volume nature of assembly-line litigation of debt collection lawsuits).
20. This phenomenon is not exclusive to procedural aspects of the law; much of the
substantive law practiced and implemented in civil courts also favors those in power and is
used to similar eﬀect.
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subordination for profit. The role of the state in driving this process
should not be underestimated. Framing the civil courts as neutral and
passive arbiters of private civil disputes—rather than as agents of the state
helping to maintain the social order necessary for racial capitalism to
function21—diminishes courts’ responsibility for the harm they perpetuate
and undermines the ability to address it.
In Part I of this Essay, we examine various perspectives that have been
oﬀered to date on the relationship between race and civil justice. As we
demonstrate, although there are some notable exceptions,22 much of the
literature relating to the civil legal system has focused on disproportionate
racial impact—including disparities in access and treatment—rather than
theorizing about the court system’s role in creating or maintaining those
disparities. In contrast, the relationship between race and systemic
design—including relevant court processes and procedures—has been
more thoroughly explored in the context of the criminal legal system. We
suggest that the justifications for this imbalance are inadequate and
highlight several important examples of deeper theorizing as to how race
and racism have shaped the civil legal system.
In Part II, we begin with an overview of the scholarly literature on
racial capitalism, highlighting the aspects most relevant to state civil
courts. Theories of racial capitalism show us not only that racism and
capitalism are fundamentally intertwined, but also that capitalism requires
inequality and relies on racialized systems of exploitation and extraction
to generate and accumulate capital. While often associated with traditional
economic systems, racial capitalism is both dynamic and malleable and
applies equally to nonmarket forums, including state courts.
After examining racial capitalism in broader terms, we translate these
concepts to the civil court context and show how civil courts serve as sites
of racial capitalism, carrying forward the historical role of white
supremacy. Through a broad-strokes discussion of civil court processes, we
demonstrate how the courts assist in capital accumulation through
patterns of racialized extraction and dispossession; these processes are, in
turn, facilitated and justified through racialized devaluation and
commodification of elements critical to human survival. The courts create
opportunities for the extraction of financial assets and products of labor
from subordinated people and for their transfer to entities that become
more powerful as a result; it is racial subordination that makes this process
tolerable and allows the courts to subjugate individuals’ humanity to their
role in a larger capitalist structure. Ultimately, we argue that a primary
function of the civil courts is to produce profit for those with capital; to do
21. Cf., e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948) (emphasizing the court’s role as
an arm of the state in enforcing private contracts that restricted property ownership to white
persons); see id. at 20 (“The judicial action in each case bears the clear and unmistakable
imprimatur of the State.”).
22. See, for example, the discussion in Part I of work done by Dorothy E. Roberts and
others in the family and child welfare contexts.
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so, they must maintain the racialized social and economic order that role
requires.
Using consumer debt collection as a case study, Part III of the Essay
illustrates how civil court structures and practices facilitate and enforce
racial capitalism. In the spiraling world of debt collection, where poor and
racialized defendants borrow money for necessities that then costs them
far more to repay, courts issue default judgments en masse.23 The courts
forgo procedural requirements in favor of speedy proceedings and
financial extraction, even when fraudulent practices such as “robosigning” and “sewer service” are at play.24 The way in which courts process
debt collection cases—and their use of default judgments in particular—
facilitates extraction from poor, predominately Black communities and
the accumulation of capital by powerful corporate interests; and it does so
to a broader degree than the substantive law alone would require. Many
aspects of the courts’ approach to civil adjudication are not required by
the law itself, but instead reflect choices made based on the premise that
racialized people are less valuable and that economic values outweigh
basic human needs. The common racialized identity of the people
targeted by the debt collection industry feeds the narrative that they are
lesser and undeserving of better treatment while ensuring an oppressed
class that can support the capitalist structure;25 it also renders their existing
treatment tolerable rather than fodder for moral outrage.
In sum, we use the conceptual framing of racial capitalism to
demonstrate how the civil courts operate to reinforce and perpetuate
systems of social and economic injustice against racialized communities,
who are, in many instances, Black men, women, and families. While we
argue that civil courts contribute to and facilitate racial capitalism, we also
acknowledge that the inequality and subordination integral to racial
capitalism run far deeper and the forces fueling racial capitalism range far
wider than the reach of courts. Therefore, although we support various
court reforms for reasons beyond the scope of this Essay,26 we do not
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part III.
25. We want to acknowledge the role that intersectionality may play in the relationship
between the courts and racial capitalism. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. Legal Forum 139, 139. In courts where
a large number of aﬀected individuals are Black women, multiple forms of disadvantage
may interact to produce particular dynamics of subordination (distinct from that applied to
all Black people or all women).
26. See, e.g., Tonya L. Brito, The Right to Civil Counsel, 148 Daedalus 56 (2019)
(advocating for a civil right-to-counsel that is national in scope, adequately funded, and protected from political influence); Tonya L. Brito, David J. Pate Jr., Daanika Gordon &
Amanda Ward, What We Know and Need to Know About Civil Gideon, 67 S.C. L. Rev. 223
(2016) [hereinafter Brito et al., Civil Gideon] (identifying additional research needed for an
eﬀective implementation of civil Gideon); Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Simplicity as Justice, 2018 Wis.
L. Rev. 287, 288–89 [hereinafter Sabbeth, Simplicity as Justice] (critiquing overemphasis on
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suggest that court-driven changes, such as the provision of additional
procedural protections, would lead to systems change of the order that
challenging racial capitalism requires.
The application of the racial capitalism framework in this Essay is not
intended to generate solutions, but it helps us to understand how and why
civil courts operate as they do. Racial subjugation is not incidental or
external, but central to the economic exploitation facilitated by courts
through the processing of cases involving housing, debt, and family
relationships. Eviction is not only about repossession of a home, but also
about seizing the products of racialized tenants’ labor27 and instilling fear
to prevent resistance.28 Child support is less about transferring funds to
custodial parents than it is about the state seizing pennies from Black
fathers as payback for public benefits received by the custodial parent.29
Debt collection is less about ensuring debts are repaid than about ensuring
the smooth, one-directional flow of capital from Black communities to
powerful corporations.30 Courts orchestrate the handling of these cases so
that the people involved are devalued and their needs rendered mere
commodities; the process is swift and easy for powerful, repeat actors. By
engaging in these practices, the civil courts normalize, legitimize, and

simplification in the context of pro se court reform); Kathryn A. Sabbeth,
(Under)Enforcement of Poor Tenants’ Rights, 27 Geo. J. Poverty L. & Pol’y 97, 139–44
(2019) [hereinafter Sabbeth, (Under)Enforcement] (proposing a mix of public and private
enforcement schemes to better protect tenants’ rights); Jessica K. Steinberg, A Theory of
Civil Problem-Solving Courts, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1579, 1594–85 (2018) (explaining how the
problem-solving court model might be adapted to the civil context); Jessica K. Steinberg,
Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 Conn. L. Rev. 741, 747 (2015) (advocating for court-driven rather than party-driven reform eﬀorts); Lauren Sudeall, Rethinking
the Civil–Criminal Distinction, in Transforming Criminal Justice: An Evidence-Based
Agenda for Reform (NYU Press, forthcoming) (manuscript at 20–21) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Sudeall, Rethinking the Civil–Criminal Distinction]
(arguing that courts should eschew a rigid civil–criminal distinction in favor of a more
holistic and litigant-focused approach); Lauren Sudeall, The Overreach of Limits on “Legal
Advice,” 131 Yale L.J. Forum 637, 653–55 (2022) (advocating for courts to employ narrower
definitions of legal advice and thus relay critical information to litigants about the law and
legal process); Lauren Sudeall & Daniel Pasciuti, Praxis and Paradox: Inside the Black Box
of Eviction Court, 74 Vand. L. Rev. 1365, 1427–31 (2021) (suggesting that courts should
develop forms and procedures that better inform and elicit the most relevant information
from litigants).
27. Rent eats more than fifty percent of many household incomes. Millions of Americans
Burdened by Housing Costs in 2015, Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud. Harv. Univ.,
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/son2017-housing-cost-burdens-table [https://perma.cc/34L6DABC] (last visited Feb. 11, 2022).
28. See Philip Garboden & Eva Rosen, Serial Filing: How Landlords Use the Threat of
Eviction, 18 Cty. & Cmty. 638, 640 (2019) (“The daily threat of eviction subjugates poor
tenants, stripping them of their consumer rights.”); Sabbeth, Eviction Courts, supra note 2,
at 402 (arguing that eviction courts function “to enforce the existing social order”).
29. See infra section II.B.1.
30. See infra Part III.
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perpetuate a racialized social and economic order that allows racial
capitalism to thrive.
I. THE LANDSCAPE OF RACE AND CIVIL JUSTICE
Civil justice scholarship has focused relatively little on the influence
of race on state civil courts and the processes they employ.31 This is due in
part to a dearth of race-specific empirical data, which can be diﬃcult to
obtain in state courts and is tracked much more pervasively in the criminal
legal system.32 Regardless of the cause, the range of available literature
provides ample room for more theoretical engagement with the relationship between race and the design, structure, and operation of the civil
legal system. This Part aims to illustrate several perspectives that have been
covered by existing race and civil justice scholarship and demonstrate how
this Essay seeks to advance the conversation.
Rebecca Sandefur noted more than a decade ago that while civil
access-to-justice literature touched on racial diﬀerences in how individuals
experience legal problems and the legal process, there was little to no
research on how race influences the frequency with which those problems
arise, how they are handled, and what outcomes result.33 While the literature has since expanded to cover more ground, a related distinction
remains: Much of scholarly writing on the relationship between race and
civil justice has focused on civil claims of race-based discrimination or how
the civil legal system disproportionately impacts racialized individuals and
communities. Less has been written about the relationship between race
and the structure and design of legal structures and processes that, in theory, provide a means of attaining civil justice.
A survey of the existing literature on race and the civil legal system
supports this distinction. Much of that literature focuses on one of several
areas: (1) racially disproportionate participation and outcomes;34 (2)
31. Brito et al., I Do for My Kids, supra note 2, at 3028 (“Although the population of
low-income Americans most aﬀected by the civil justice gap is disproportionately minority,
race and racial inequality are understudied areas of inquiry in the access to justice
literature.”).
32. See Scott DeVito, Of Bias and Exclusion: An Empirical Study of Diversity Jurisdiction, Its Amount-In-Controversy Requirement, and Black Alienation from U.S. Civil Courts,
13 Geo. J.L. & Mod. Critical Race Persps. 1, 5–6 (2021) (pinpointing a primary diﬃculty of
conducting empirical research on race and the civil justice system to the lack of data identifying the race of litigants in the civil justice system); cf. Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data, 101 Minn. L. Rev. 541, 549 (2016) (“Data on
individuals has long been the lifeblood of the criminal justice system.”).
33. Sandefur, Access to Civil Justice, supra note 2, at 350.
34. See, e.g., Matthew Desmond, Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty, 118
Am. J. Socio. 88, 102 tbl.3 (2012) (describing the overrepresentation of Black men and
women as tenants in eviction court); Avital Mentovich, J.J. Prescott & Orna Rabinovich-Einy,
Are Litigation Outcome Disparities Inevitable? Courts, Technology, and the Future of
Impartiality, 71 Ala. L. Rev. 893, 953 (2020) (discussing findings that Black litigants receive
higher court fines and lower rates of charge reductions in civil-infraction proceedings, but
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attitudes toward the civil legal system;35 (3) how race aﬀects actors present
in the civil legal system;36 (4) racial inequalities with respect to civil legal
resources, such as access to counsel;37 and (5) claims based on racial discrimination.38 To the extent empirical access-to-justice research has
that these disparities diminish in online proceedings); Kathryn Ramsey Mason, Crime-Free
Housing Ordinances and Evictions, 36 Inst. for Rsch. on Poverty Focus 12, 19–20 (2020)
(discussing the disproportionate number of Black women facing eviction).
35. Several articles have explored how racial minorities view the civil legal system—
largely influenced by negative experiences and feelings of disillusionment—and how those
views aﬀect their future actions with respect to civil legal issues, including their likelihood
to seek out assistance or engage with the system. See, e.g., Sara Sternberg Greene, Race,
Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1263, 1268 (2016) (explaining how distrust and narratives of self-suﬃciency lead to a decreased likelihood that Black respondents
seek out legal assistance for their civil legal problems); Amy Myrick, Robert L. Nelson &
Laura Beth Nielsen, Race and Representation: Racial Disparities in Legal Representation
for Employment Civil Rights Plaintiﬀs, 15 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 705, 751–52 (2012)
(describing negative experiences and impressions of minority litigants); see also David
McElhattan, Laura Beth Nielsen & Jill D. Weinberg, Race and Determinations of Discrimination: Vigilance, Cynicism, Skepticism, and Attitudes About Legal Mobilization in
Employment Civil Rights, 51 Law & Soc’y Rev. 669, 669–70, 686–88 (2017) (noting minimal
scholarship on the legal cynicism of civil justice institutions but finding a “higher legal confidence held by African Americans and Latinos compared to whites,” indicating that these
groups “may hold views of the legal system that are more amenable to mobilizing law in
response to workplace disputes”); Stephen S. Meinhold & David W. Neubauer, Exploring
Attitudes About the Litigation Explosion, 22 Just. Sys. J. 105, 107 (2001) (hypothesizing that
“African-Americans [are] more supportive than whites of using the courts to redress grievances”).
36. See, e.g., Brito et al., I Do for My Kids, supra note 2, at 3049 (“Each of these poor,
Black citizens is present in [family court] but, neither seen nor heard by the legal actors
present, is rendered invisible in that space.”); Geneva Brown, Ain’t I a Victim? The Intersectionality of Race, Class, and Gender in Domestic Violence and the Courtroom, 19 Cardozo
J.L. & Gender 147, 147, 150 (2012) (noting that “African American women who seek protection from . . . the courts encounter a legal system that has fixed notions of African
Americans as more susceptible and amenable to violence,” thus rendering the process of
seeking redress more diﬃcult for them); Victor D. Quintanilla, Doing Unrepresented Status: The Social Construction and Production of Pro Se Persons, 69 DePaul L. Rev. 543, 583
(2020) (noting that unrepresented parties are viewed diﬀerently by court oﬃcials and lawyers due to bias; for example, educated white men are viewed as “empowered, selfrepresented parties and treated with more respect” than an African American disabled
woman would be); see also Melissa L. Breger, The (In)visibility of Motherhood in Family
Court Proceedings, N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 555, 557 (2012) (noting that scholars have
questioned “whether the family law system itself is inherently discriminatory toward persons
of color”).
37. Myrick et al., supra note 35, at 708 (demonstrating and exploring reasons for differential representation rates); see also Martha F. Davis, Race and Civil Counsel in the
United States: A Human Rights Progress Report, 64 Syracuse L. Rev. 447, 451–54 (2014)
(highlighting the existence and impact of racial disparities in access to civil counsel). Cf.
Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon, supra note 2, at 95–96 (arguing that creation
of a right to counsel for tenants promotes race and gender equality).
38. See, e.g., Ellen Berrey, Sociology Finds Discrimination in the Law, 8 Contexts 28,
29 (2009) (discussing strengths of employment law in adjudicating “flagrant acts of racism”
but its simultaneous weakness of failing to remedy unintentional and implicit discrimination
ingrained in networks and organizational practices); McElhattan et al., supra note 35, at 688

1254

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1243

expanded its scope in exploring connections between racial inequality and
civil justice, it has focused primarily on how racial prejudice and other
related forms of discrimination influence the legal process.39 For example,
the work of Tonya L. Brito, David J. Pate, Jr., and Jia-Hui Stefanie Wong
explores how racialized litigant experiences and court actors’ insistence
on ignoring race-based inequalities impact the family court process.40
Several scholars—particularly in the family law arena—have taken on
the task of not only highlighting racial disparities in access and impact but
also theorizing about the role of race in creating such disparities and why
those disparities exist and persist. For example, Dorothy Roberts, Khiara
Bridges, and Peggy Cooper Davis have written about how racism has
shaped the civil legal systems that regulate families, children, and pregnancy.41 Roberts has painstakingly detailed how racism and the legacy of
slavery have not only informed the development of the law, but also
explain why society is willing to tolerate such a destructive and punitive
system.42 Roberts’s work clearly demonstrates how civil legal systems have
the power to both implement and perpetuate racial subordination.43 Just
as these scholars have done for systems of family and reproductive regulation, there is far more probing to be done with respect to how the civil
(finding that African American individuals perceive more anti-Black discrimination than do
other racial groups); Myrick et al., supra note 35, at 707–08 (discussing disproportionate
percentage of plaintiﬀs in employment discrimination lawsuit filing pro se, which tends to
lead to “significantly worse litigation outcomes,” such as failing to survive summary judgment); Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 Ann. Rev. Socio. 181,
185–86 (2008) (noting discrimination claims from 1970 through 1997 shifted from an
emphasis on racial discrimination toward emphasis on gender and disability
discrimination).
39. See Brito et al., I Do for My Kids, supra note 2, at 3049.
40. See id. at 3028.
41. We provide here just a few examples of the many relevant works these scholars have
produced. See Khiara M. Bridges, Reproducing Race: An Ethnography of Pregnancy as a
Site of Racialization 10–11 (2011); Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories: The Constitution
and Family Values 66 (1997); Roberts, Shattered Bonds, supra note 2, at 276; Khiara M.
Bridges, Race, Pregnancy, and the Opioid Epidemic: White Privilege and the
Criminalization of Opioid Use During Pregnancy, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 770, 776–77 (2020);
Khiara M. Bridges, Racial Disparities in Maternal Mortality, 95 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1229, 1235–38
(2020); Peggy Cooper Davis, Loving v. Virginia and White Supremacy, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
Online 48, 50–52 (2017); Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Protection as Surveillance of African
American Families, 36 J. Soc. Welfare & Fam. L. 426, 427–29 (2014); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1474,
1478–83 (2012). See also Tonya L. Brito & Sofia Jonas, Breastfeeding, Race and Mutual Aid,
57 Cal. W. L. Rev. 257, 264–65 (2021).
42. Roberts, Shattered Bonds, supra note 2, at 276 (“Why would Americans prefer a
punitive system that needlessly separates thousands of children from their parents and
consigns millions more to social exclusion and economic deprivation? . . . Only by coming
to terms with child welfare’s racial injustice can we turn from the costly path of family
destruction.”).
43. Id. at viii (arguing that the child welfare system is “a state run program that disrupts, restructures, and polices Black families”).
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court system design incorporates, relies upon, and intentionally maintains
racial hierarchies.
In contrast, there has been a significant amount of theorizing about
how racially oppressive social and economic systems—including, most
prominently, the institution of slavery—have influenced the criminal legal
system’s purpose and design.44 This imbalance between civil and criminal
is driven by several factors—but is also unjustified. As some of us have
touched on in our own scholarship, doctrinal and constitutional distinctions between civil and criminal foster persistent conceptual diﬀerences.
For example, the emphasis on incarceration serves as a touchstone for
rights provision and the increased level of procedural protections aﬀorded
to criminal matters, suggesting higher stakes and greater importance.45
Relatedly, there is a distinction in how the harms perpetuated by the criminal and civil legal systems are understood and valued—a distinction we
would argue is disputed by how these systems have evolved and now operate in practice.46 Criminal law is often characterized as involving violence
by the state and the deprivation of physical liberty, in contrast to civil law,
which is thought to relate primarily to disputes between private actors and
unlikely to result in incarceration.47 Thus, civil harm may be thought of as
more removed from the types of state action that are typically actionable
44. See generally, e.g., Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in
the Age of Colorblindness (2010); Douglas A. Blackmon, Slavery by Another Name: The ReEnslavement of Black People in America From the Civil War to World War II (2008);
Matthew Clair, Privilege and Punishment: How Race and Class Matter in Criminal Court
(2020); David D. Cole, No Equal Justice (1999); James Forman, Jr., Locking Up Our Own:
Crime and Punishment of Black Americans (2017); Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the
Law (1997); Bryan Stevenson, Just Mercy: A Story of Justice and Redemption (2015).
45. Sudeall, Rethinking the Civil–Criminal Distinction, supra note 26 (describing common understandings of the diﬀerences between criminal and civil and how rights and
procedural protections are distributed according to those labels); Brito et al., Civil Gideon,
supra note 26, at 227–28 (describing how the Turner v. Rogers holding, denying a
constitutional right to counsel in a civil contempt proceeding, exposing the defendant to
incarceration, departs from the Lassiter v. Department of Social Services precedent, which
established a presumption that a right to counsel would attach when there is a risk of loss of
physical liberty); Kathryn A. Sabbeth, The Prioritization of Criminal Over Civil Counsel and
the Discounted Danger of Private Power, 42 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 889, 905–16 (2015)
[hereinafter, Sabbeth, Prioritization of Criminal Over Civil Counsel] (describing the view
that incarceration and the stigma of criminal conviction make criminal matters uniquely
deserving of a right to counsel, but questioning “whether the interests at stake for criminal
defendants are categorically of higher value than the interests of civil litigants”).
46. See Sabbeth, Prioritization of Criminal Over Civil Counsel, supra note 45, at 912–
16, 920–21, 923–27, 930–34; Sudeall, Rethinking the Civil–Criminal Distinction, supra note
26, at 2; see also Lauren Sudeall, Integrating the Access to Justice Movement, 87 Fordham
L. Rev. Online 172, 172 (2019) [hereinafter Sudeall, Integrating the Access to Justice Movement] (noting that individuals’ experiences often do not fall cleanly along criminal and civil
lines).
47. See Sabbeth, Prioritization of Criminal Over Civil Counsel, supra note 45, at 905,
916; Sudeall, Rethinking the Civil-Criminal Distinction, supra note 26, at 2, 12. But see
Sabbeth, Simplicity as Justice, supra note 26, at 297 (“The state creates, maintains, adjudicates, and enforces all law. Ultimately the state’s force is at play in all adjudication.”).

1256

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1243

under the law.48 In the modern era, however, these lines are far more
blurred: The state plays a prominent role in many civil proceedings—
particularly those involving economically and racially marginalized individuals—and financial penalties can result in the criminal sphere just as
deprivation of liberty can occur in the civil.49 Civil issues aﬀecting poor
people of color are also often seen as simple or nonlegal in nature;50 this
delegalization of such claims leads to subsequent delegitimization and,
thus, less urgency to fully understand how race impacts the systems that
process such claims.
Portia Pedro recently underscored this distinction between civil and
criminal by observing that there is less “comprehensive theoretical description of the mutually constitutive and reinforcing relationship” between
civil law and racial subjugation or white supremacy than in other areas,
such as constitutional and criminal law.51 Pedro emphasizes the
importance of thinking about how doctrine, and procedural rules and
mechanisms, can be used to reinforce racial subordination, even in areas
of the law that are often cast as objective and substantively distinct from
issues of race, like civil procedure.52 And she rightly observes that the
underdevelopment (and underapplication) of Critical Race Theory in civil
procedure is likely due to a flawed understanding of civil procedure as

48. See, e.g. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503, 507–
09 (1985) (discussing the requirement of state action to benefit from constitutional
protections); Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class
Determinations and the Poor, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 323, 341 (2016) (discussing the Supreme
Court’s unwillingness to recognize wealth distinctions as a basis for legal challenge). But see
Chemerinsky, supra, at 524 (suggesting “state action is present in all private violations of
constitutional rights”).
49. See Sabbeth, Prioritization of Criminal Over Civil Counsel, supra note 45, at 923–
28 (identifying civil cases in which the state is the individual’s adversary, and explaining how
the role of the state and the role of private power have evolved over time); id. at 907 (noting
that loss of liberty no longer provides a clear distinction between civil and criminal cases);
Sudeall, Integrating the Access to Justice Movement, supra note 46. See also Tonya L. Brito,
Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy Toward Low-Income Fathers and
Their Families, 15 Iowa J. Gender Race & Just. 617, 618–20 (2012); Melissa Murray, Strange
Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 Iowa
L. Rev. 1253, 1256–58 (2009).
50. Sabbeth, Simplicity as Justice, supra note 26, at 302 (arguing that “the underdevelopment of law on behalf of the poor recreates itself in an unfortunate feedback loop”
whereby the Supreme Court denies the right to counsel to litigants with purportedly
“simple” claims, thereby decreasing the availability of lawyers who could develop the common law governing those claims); Sabbeth, Market-Based Law Development, supra note 4
(“Assumptions about whose cases are worthy of attention legitimize the simplification of
entire bodies of law and de-legalization of lower status courts.”). See also Sabbeth,
(Under)Enforcement, supra note 26, at 135–37 (arguing that courts “underdevelop” tenants’ rights through “snowballing underenforcement”).
51. Portia Pedro, A Prelude to a Critical Race Theoretical Account of Civil Procedure,
107 Va. L. Rev. Online 143, 158 (2021).
52. Id. at 145, 159.
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“technical,” “neutral,” “objective,” or “perspectiveless[].”53 We argue that
the same is true of civil courts and court procedures, where connections
not only to race, but also—given their association with the private realm—
to the role of the state and to the maintenance of social order are less likely
to be drawn.
The civil courts govern fundamental aspects of daily life—including
housing, employment, financial obligations, personal safety, and family
relationships. As Colleen Shanahan, Jessica Steinberg, Anna Carpenter,
and Alyx Mark have argued, state civil courts are confronted with social
needs they are ill-equipped to handle, and in this context “can play the
role of violent actor when exercising their dispute resolution function.”54
Civil court cases impose on tens of millions of people devastating legal and
financial consequences, as well as physical, social, and emotional harm.55
Thus, more thorough exploration of how the processes and procedures
these courts use in adjudicating such claims rely on and advance racial
subordination is critical. In this Essay, we aim to build upon and complement the above literature by exploring how the procedures developed and
maintained by state civil courts facilitate and maintain racial capitalism.
II. RACIAL CAPITALISM AND CIVIL JUSTICE
The state’s use of the civil legal system as a tool to legitimize and
enforce racial exploitation is a phenomenon as old as this nation. Civil
courts repeatedly legitimized slavery, an openly violent institution that
ensured a racialized subordinate workforce. The U.S. Supreme Court’s
Dred Scott decision may be among the most infamous, ruling that Black
people were not citizens so did not have standing to bring claims, and
ultimately the plaintiﬀ’s claims to freedom failed.56 But this was one of
many decisions to reserve for white people the privileges of citizenship.57
53. Id. at 159, 164. Likewise, legal scholars have begun to examine the significance of
race in other seemingly neutral areas of law, such as tax, see generally Dorothy A. Brown,
Race and Class in Tax Policy, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 790 (2007), and banking, see generally
Mehrsa Baradaran, The Color of Money: Black Banks and the Racial Wealth Gap (2019).
54. Shanahan et al., Institutional Mismatch, supra note 11, at 1516–17; see Sabbeth,
Simplicity as Justice, supra note 26, at 297 (“The state literally enforces those judgments
parties refuse or are unable to satisfy . . . . The violence of economic force can be as
important as violence to the physical body, and, ultimately, the latter is always available to
back up the former.”).
55. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Accessing Justice in the Contemporary USA: Findings
From the Community Needs and Services Survey 7–10 (2014).
56. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 475–76 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment,
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
57. See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 214–15 (1923) (ruling on the question of
who was white enough to become a naturalized citizen); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S.
178, 197 (1922) (ruling that “only a person of what is popularly known as the Caucasian
race” was a “white person[]” entitled to naturalized citizenship); López, supra note 15, at
35–77 (describing court decisions that evaluated and ruled on parties’ races as a prerequisite
to their entitlement to naturalize as citizens); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
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Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the lower civil courts, too, have engaged
in the social construction of race and guarded the rights of citizenship for
people identified as white. Cheryl Harris demonstrated in Whiteness as
Property that civil courts have a long history of resolving everyday contract
and property disputes in ways that solidify and entrench the power of white
supremacy.58 Even after slavery formally ended, the lower civil courts
continued to play an important role in policing the boundaries of
whiteness and the rights that go with it. The work of Ian Haney López and
Ariela Gross describes how courts considered in detail how to construct
the race of the individuals before them. Courts parsed physical
characteristics, other markers of social belonging, and so-called common
expectations, and they debated how race should be determined, ultimately
deciding the races of the parties before them, with serious consequences.59
Race-making practices like these, which perpetuate ideologies of
racial inferiority and exaggerate racial diﬀerences, serve to facilitate and
justify social inequality.60 It is not simply that the courts have allowed racial
categories to mark the groups of people who are exploited and those who
profit, but also that the courts have actively constructed race and thereby
made systemic racial exploitation appear rational.61 With the legitimacy
and enforcement that the courts oﬀer, explicit and implicit hierarchies of
racial diﬀerence—which recognize some people as more fully human than
others—then justify the looting of communities of color in plain sight.62

Harv. L. Rev. 1707, 1716–23 (1993) [hereinafter Harris, Whiteness as Property]; see also
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, According to Our Hearts: Rhinelander v. Rhinelander and the
Law of the Multiracial Family 2–4 (2013).
58. Harris, Whiteness as Property, supra note 57, at 1716–23.
59. López, supra note 15, at 3 (“From the first prerequisite case in 1878 until racial
restrictions were removed in 1952, fifty-two racial prerequisite cases were reported, including two heard by the U.S. Supreme Court.”); Gross, supra note 15, at 178 (“After emancipation, courtrooms continued to be the fora for determining people’s racial status. Voting
restrictions, segregated school systems, and laws prohibiting interracial marriage and
fornication guaranteed that courts would still be adjudicating people’s racial status well into
the twentieth century.”).
60. Destin Jenkins & Justin Leroy, Introduction: The Old History of Capitalism, in
Histories of Racial Capitalism 1, 7–8 (Destin Jenkins & Justin Leroy eds., 2021) (citing
Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery, Race, and Ideology in United States History, 181 New Left
Rev. 95, 115 (1990)).
61. See K-Sue Park, Race, Innovation, and Financial Growth: The Example of Foreclosure, in Histories of Racial Capitalism 27, 34 (arguing that colonial practices of dispossession
preceded racial ideologies, which colonists then created to explain the coexistence of the
foundational American values of equality and freedom with the foundational American
practices of colonial pillaging and slavery).
62. Id. at 30 (“This license to use racial violence presented an especially malleable and
nearly inexhaustible resource for colonists, as it cost little beyond their willingness to transgress familiar boundaries placed on the treatment of other humans . . . .”).
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Through the courts, the state maintains the racial order, framing its
tools as civilized while wielding power with a thinly veiled threat of force.63
Oﬃcers of the law regularly exert that force to arrange compliance with
court decisions.64 The connection between the criminal legal system and
the racist violence of the state has received significant attention,65 as it
should, but the civil courts, too, perpetuate racialized violence. The lens
of racial capitalism helps to reveal how the criminal and civil legal systems
work in concert, maintaining a racialized underclass through the force of
the state. Capitalists rely on the power of the civil courts to maintain fear
and discipline, and to authorize the extraction of significant sums.
Recognizing that the concept of racial capitalism has thus far received
limited space on law review pages, in this Part, we first synthesize prior
literature theorizing racial capitalism before we turn to how it applies in
the civil courts.
A.

Racial Capitalism

Scholarly engagement with racial capitalism is multidisciplinary and
interdisciplinary in nature, with widespread and increasing interest across
the humanities and social sciences.66 We draw from the robust body of
scholarship that has emerged over the past couple of decades to understand its legal dimensions.67 Scholars attribute the conceptual frame of
racial capitalism to political theorist Cedric Robinson, who introduced it
in his groundbreaking book, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical
Tradition, published in 1983.68 Widespread scholarly interest in racial capitalism as a conceptual frame took oﬀ following the republication of Black
Marxism in 2000.69
The term racial capitalism originated in South Africa in the 1970s.70
South African scholars used racial capitalism to describe how the
63. See Mark Golub, Racial Capitalism and the Rule of Law, Soc. Sci. Rsch. Council:
Items (Feb. 19, 2019), https://items.ssrc.org/race-capitalism/racial-capitalism-and-therule-of-law/ [https://perma.cc/VYH3-7LSP].
64. See Shirin Sinnar, Civil Procedure in the Shadow of Violence, in A Critical Guide
to Civil Procedure (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 1–5) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); Sabbeth, Simplicity as Justice, supra note 26, at 297 (“If a losing party fails to pay a
monetary judgment, a sheriﬀ will forcibly seize her assets. If a landlord wins an eviction case,
an agent of the state will forcibly remove any tenant who remains in possession of the
property.”).
65. See supra Part I.
66. See Charisse Burden-Stelley, Modern U.S. Racial Capitalism: Some Theoretical
Insights, 72 Monthly Rev. 8, 8 (2020).
67. See id.
68. Laura Pulido, Geographies of Race and Ethnicity II: Environmental Racism, Racial
Capitalism and State-Sanctioned Violence, 41 Progress Hum. Geography 524, 526 (2017).
69. See Burden-Stelley, supra note 66, at 8; Pulido, supra note 68, at 526.
70. See Robin D.G. Kelley, What Did Cedric Robinson Mean by Racial Capitalism?, Bos.
Rev. (Jan. 12, 2017), https://bostonreview.net/articles/robin-d-g-kelley-introduction-racecapitalism-justice/ [https://perma.cc/6NP5-HBC6] [hereinafter Kelley, Racial Capitalism].
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apartheid state structured relations of race, class, and accumulation.71
Robinson developed the concept of racial capitalism, advancing it from a
description of a specific system—the political economy of apartheid South
Africa—to a framework for understanding modern capitalism.72
Robinson argued that racism was a structuring logic of capitalism.73
According to Robinson, racism and capitalism are mutually constitutive.74
In Black Marxism, he critiques conventional Marxism for mistakenly
treating racism as separate from and incidental to capitalism.75 Capitalism
is “racial,” Robinson argues, “because racialism had already permeated
Western feudal society.”76 With this claim, he refutes the Marxist notion
that capitalism was a revolutionary break from feudalism.77 Instead,
Robinson contends that capitalism was forged from a European feudal
system rife with racial hierarchies.78
European civilization diﬀerentiated its peoples by “exaggerat[ing]
regional, subcultural and dialectical diﬀerences into racial ones.”79
According to Robinson, the first modern racialized subjects were
European, including the Catholic Irish, Roma, Slavs, and Jews.80
Racialization within Europe was a colonial process, one involving processes
of invasion, settlement, and expropriation.81 Plunder and violence were
legitimated by a logic of hierarchical racial diﬀerence in which racialized
subjects at the bottom of the hierarchy have been and continue to be seen
as less human than those at the top, and, consequently assigned lower
status and less value.82
The analytical framework of racial capitalism has become prevalent in
the disciplines of history, Black Studies, and cultural and ethnic studies.
The frame also has been used by scholars in such diverse fields as political
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Robinson, supra note 9, at 2.
74. Id.
75. See Kelley, Racial Capitalism, supra note 70.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Racial Capitalism, Climate Justice, and Climate Displacement, 11 Oñati Socio-Legal Series 108, 114 (2021) [hereinafter Gonzalez, Racial Capitalism,
Climate Justice, and Climate Displacement].
79. See Robinson, supra note 9, at 26.
80. See Satnam Virdee, Racialized Capitalism: An Account of Its Contested Origins and
Consolidation, 67 Socio. Rev. 3, 6 (2019).
81. Recognizing the relationship between capitalism and colonialism, this article
focuses on the former in a way that we see as complementary to the scholarly work being
done by Indigenous scholars or those using a decolonial or settler colonial frame. See
generally, e.g., Natsu Taylor Saito, Settler Colonialism, Race, and the Law: Why Settler
Colonialism Persists (2020) (arguing that colonialism is the foundation of U.S. racial
inequities).
82. See Desiree Fields & Elora Lee Raymond, Racialized Geographies of Housing
Financialization, 45 Progress Hum. Geography 1624, 1628–29 (2021).
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science,83 sociology,84 public health,85 education,86 geography,87
international relations,88 energy geographies,89 philosophy, labor
relations,90 and law,91 though it is still relatively new within legal
academia.92
The academic literature instructs that “racism and capitalism are
fundamentally intertwined.”93 The precise phrasing regarding this feature
diﬀers slightly among scholars. For example, some scholars explain that
“racism and capitalism are inextricably intertwined”94 and others use the
term to describe a “symbiotic relationship between racism and
83. See, e.g., Siddhant Issar, Listening to Black Lives Matter: Racial Capitalism and the
Critique of Neoliberalism, 20 Contemp. Pol. Theory 48, 49 (2020); Inés Valdez, Socialism
and Empire: Labor Mobility, Racial Capitalism, and the Political Theory of Migration, 49
Pol. Theory 902, 904 (2020).
84. See, e.g., Tressie McMillan Cottom, Where Platform Capitalism and Racial Capitalism Meet: The Sociology of Race and Racism in the Digital Society, 6 Socio. Race & Ethnicity
441, 441 (2020); Zawadi Rucks-Ahidiana, Theorizing Gentrification as a Process of Racial
Capitalism, City & Community 2 (2021); Prentiss A. Dantzler, The Urban Process Under
Racial Capitalism: Race, Anti-Blackness, and Capital Accumulation, 2 J. Race Ethnicity &
City 113, 113–14 (2021).
85. See, e.g., Whitney N. Laster Pirtle, Racial Capitalism: A Fundamental Cause of
Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic Inequities in the United States, 47 Health Educ.
Behav. 504, 504 (2020); Olufemi O. Taiwo, Anne E. Fehrenbacher & Alexis Cooke, Material
Insecurity, Racial Capitalism, and Public Health, 51 Hasting Ctr. Rep. 17, 17–18 (2021).
86. See, e.g., Jessica Gerrard, Arathi Sriprakash & Sophie Rudolph, Education and
Racial Capitalism, 25 Race Ethnicity & Educ. 425, 425 (2021); Lauren Anderson, Private
Interests in a Public Profession: Teacher Education and Racial Capitalism, 121 Tchrs. Coll.
Rec. 1, 3 (2019); Lauren N. Irwin, Service-Learning and Racial Capitalism: On the
Commodification of People of Color for White Advancement, 44 Rev. Higher Edu. 419, 420
(2021).
87. See, e.g., Kendra Strauss, Labour Geography III: Precarity, Racial Capitalisms and
Infrastructure, 44 Progress Hum. Geography 1212, 1215 (2019).
88. See, e.g., Nadya Ali & Ben Whitman, Racial Capitalism, Islamophobia, and Austerity, 15 Int’l Pol. Socio. 190, 193 (2021); David Wearing, The Myth of the Reforming
Monarch: Orientalism, Racial Capitalism, and UK Support for the Arab Gulf Monarchies,
Politics 2 (2021), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/02633957211041547
[https://perma.cc/438X-QK3L].
89. See Nikki Luke, Powering Racial Capitalism: Electricity, Rate-Making, and the
Uneven Energy Geographies of Atlanta, Env’t & Plan. E: Nature & Space, June 17, 2021, at
2–3.
90. See, e.g., Rose Lenehan, Reparations, Racial Exploitation, and Racial Capitalism
53 (2019) (Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (DSpace@MIT),
https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/124099 [https://perma.cc/L7Q6-ZLGU]; Jessica
M.
Otto,
Philosophy’s
Dirty
Little
Secret:
Are
We
Trading
on
Racial
Capitalism
1–2
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://www.academia.edu/29943071/Philosophy_s_Dirty_Little_Secret_Are_We_Tradin
g_on_Racial_Capitalism [https://perma.cc/M2F5-R7FA].
91. See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 2151, 2153–54 (2013).
92. See Harris, Foreword, supra note 6, at 1–2.
93. See Fields & Raymond, supra note 82, at 1625.
94. See Gonzalez, Racial Capitalism, Climate Justice, and Climate Displacement, supra
note 78, at 114.
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capitalism.”95 In his review of the literature, sociologist Julian Go
concludes that, despite the existence of competing definitions of racial
capitalism across the wide variety of academic disciplines that are utilizing
the framework, one of the “shared features” is that “racial capitalism
implies that there are deep connections between racism or racial
inequality and capitalism.”96
Scholars have deployed racial capitalism as a conceptual framework
to understand the inextricable link between capitalism and racialization in
global terms as well as on a national scale. One strand of the scholarship
has “explor[ed] histories of colonial conquest, imperialism, and
dispossession to make visible capitalism’s relation to race.”97 Recent work
also demonstrates how racial capitalism exploits and degrades nonhuman
natural resources contributing to ecological crises,98 climate-changeinduced displacement of communities of color,99 and the accelerated
demise of racialized communities through the “slow violence” inflicted by
the fossil fuel industry.100 Other scholars use the frame to understand how
capitalism’s racial hierarchies bolster systems of dispossession through
gentrification and neoliberal urban governance,101 caste education in
public schooling,102 labor extraction in the carceral state,103 unequal access
to aﬀordable electricity that produces pollution, poverty, and utility shutoﬀs,104 and the emergence and spread of COVID-19.105

95. Id.
96. See Julian Go, Three Tensions in the Theory of Racial Capitalism, 39 Socio. Theory
38, 39 (2020); see also, Jenkins & Leroy, supra note 60, at 3 (explaining that although “definitional debates” exist, many scholars “place an emphasis on explaining how capitalism
works rather than setting out to define precisely what capitalism is”).
97. See Go, supra note 96, at 40.
98. See Bikrum Singh Gill, A World in Reverse: The Political Ecology of Racial Capitalism, Politics, Dec. 19, 2020, at 2 (“Engaging the racial capitalism framework, with its
premise of race as a constituting condition of possibility for the emergence of capitalism . . .
accords a more foundational significance to race as a structuring relation of power driving
planetary ecological crises.”).
99. See Gonzalez, Racial Capitalism, Climate Justice, and Climate Displacement, supra
note 78, at 113–19.
100. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Racial Capitalism and the Anthropocene, in The
Cambridge Handbook of Environmental Justice and Sustainable Development 72, 78
(Sumudu A. Atapattu, Carmen G. Gonzalez & Sara L. Seck eds., 2021) [hereinafter
Gonzalez, Racial Capitalism and the Anthropocene].
101. See Rucks-Ahidiana, supra note 84, at 2.
102. See Clayton Pierce, W.E.B. Du Bois and Caste Education: Racial Capitalist Schooling From Reconstruction to Jim Crow, 54 Ame. Edu. Rsch. J. 25, 27–29, 33–35 (2017).
103. See William Calathes, Racial Capitalism and Punishment Philosophy and Practices:
What Really Stands in the Way of Prison Abolition, 20 Contemp. Just. Rev. 442, 448–49
(2017).
104. See Luke, supra note 89, at 2–3.
105. See Alexander Liebman, Kevon Rhiney & Rob Wallace, To Die a Thousand Deaths:
COVID-19, Racial Capitalism, and Anti-Black Violence, 13 Hum. Geography 331, 332–33
(2020).
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One strand of scholarship that bears directly on issues we take up
examines racialized debt within contemporary sites of extraction through
domination and dispossession, including systems of educational debt
servitude,106 predatory inclusion in housing financialization,107 and stateimposed predatory fees and fines.108 Noting a focus on debt in the work of
racial capitalism scholars, historians Destin Jenkins and Justin Leroy
suggest that “it is the coercive terms, extended temporality, and
redistributive consequences of debt that make credit and debt particularly
revealing in transitions between diﬀerent moments in racial capitalism’s
history.”109
Racialized debt extraction is so prevalent and supported that it thrives
even in nonmarket systems intended to be socially beneficial, including
higher education and public welfare. In their article examining the
student debt crisis in the United States through the lens of racial
capitalism, Jalil B. Mustaﬀa and Caleb Dawson demonstrate how student
loans are a form of predatory inclusion for Black students rather than a
“good debt” that fulfills higher education’s promise of upward social and
economic mobility.110 The federal and state governments play an
interlocking role with the private student loan industry in a profit-making
scheme that leaves far too many Black students with unpayable debts and
no college credentials.111 Government promotion of broader college
access for disadvantaged groups took place alongside decades of
increasing public disinvestment in higher education made possible by a
dramatic shift from grants to student loans.112 Thus, “[t]hrough student
loans, the government [has] reconfigure[d] the costs of ‘providing’ access
or justice for Black people into a lucrative economic market more than a
benevolent social investment.”113
Likewise, public welfare programs meant to alleviate poverty can be
sites of racialized debt extraction. In her ethnographic study, Erin
Torkelson documents the phenomenon whereby monthly cash assistance
in the form of family maintenance grants provided by the South African
government to poor caregivers were racially expropriated by the
multinational corporation contracted to distribute grants.114 The
106. See Ali Mir & Saadia Toor, Racial Capitalism and Student Debt in the U.S., Organization, Feb. 24, 2021, at 2.
107. See Fields & Raymond, supra note 82, at 1637–39.
108. See Joshua Page & Joe Soss, The Predatory Dimensions of Criminal Justice, 374
Science 291, 291–293 (2021).
109. Jenkins & Leroy, supra note 60, at 18.
110. See Jalil B. Mustafa & Caleb Dawson, Racial Capitalism and the Black Student Loan
Debt Crisis, 123 Tchrs. Coll. Rec. 1, 9 (2021).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 11.
114. See Erin Torkelson, Sofia’s Choice: Debt, Social Welfare, and Racial Finance Capitalism, 39 Env’t & Plan. D: Soc’y & Space 67, 73–76 (2021).
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corporation took complete control of recipients’ grants; it distributed the
grants, aggressively marketed high-interest loans on the grants, engaged
recipients in other costly financial transactions without their consent, and
repaid itself and other lenders before providing grant funds to the
intended recipients.115 According to Torkelson, grant recipients contested
the debt and “oﬀered trans-generational critiques of indebtedness,
explaining how debt has been attached to particular racialized people in
South Africa across time.”116
Along with the inextricable connection between racism and
capitalism, this Essay draws from several key features of racial capitalism to
inform our analysis of how racial capitalism operates in state civil courts.
First, racial capitalism is a system of capital accumulation that requires
racialized systems of exploitation and extraction.117 According to legal
scholar Athena Mutua, “exploitation involves the commodification of
labor and its free exchange on markets for incomes that are at least
theoretically suﬃcient to meet life’s basic needs.”118 Capitalists extract
surplus value from laborers by not paying workers the full value of their
eﬀort.119 This mechanism of capital accumulation is exploitative because
the exchange is not one of equivalents.120 Expropriation, which exists
alongside exploitation, is a more extreme and oppressive form of capital
expansion that involves the outright theft, confiscation, and
commandeering of resources and capacities.121 Expropriation is an
ongoing and often violent capitalist process.122 In the context of labor
relations, some scholars describe expropriation as a form of super-

115. Id. at 76.
116. Id. at 81.
117. See
Nancy
Fraser,
Is
Capitalism
Necessarily
Racist?,
Politics/
Letters (May 20, 2019), http://quarterly.politicsslashletters.org/is-capitalism-necessarily-racist/
[https://perma.cc/NJ5J-3FVW]. Scholars use the terms extraction and expropriation
interchangeably.
118. See ClassCrits, ClassCrits 2020–2021 Workshop #7: Racial Capitalism, YouTube, at
09:30 (Mar. 10, 2021), https://youtu.be/47aKTJ1YxJw [https://perma.cc/2LN6-UGJA].
119. See Nancy Fraser, Expropriation and Exploitation in Racialized Capitalism: A
Reply to Michael Dawson, 3 Critical Hist. Stud. 163, 164–164 & n.1 (2016) [hereinafter
Fraser, Expropriation and Exploitation] (citing Karl Marx, 1 Capital, at 781–802, 854–70,
914–26, 931–40 (Ben Fowkes trans., 1976)).
120. See Nancy Fraser, Behind Marx’s Hidden Abode: For an Expanded Conception of
Capitalism, 86 New Left Rev. 55, 60–61 (2014) [hereinafter Fraser, Behind Marx’s Hidden
Abode] (“[A]ccumulation proceeds via exploitation. Capital expands . . . not via the
exchange of equivalents, as the market perspective suggest, but through its opposite: via the
non-compensation of a portion of workers’ labour-time.”).
121. See Nancy Fraser, Expropriation and Exploitation, supra note 119, at 166–69
(highlighting the diﬀerent forms expropriation takes and the structural reasons capitalistic
society resorts to expropriation).
122. Id.
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exploitation involving below-subsistence wages.123 Slavery, genocide, and
colonial settlement are commonly cited as historical instances of
expropriation. While less physically violent, contemporary forms of
expropriation abound, including dispossession of land and housing
through foreclosures on predatory subprime loans, commandeering
human capacities through uncompensated prison labor, underfunding
racially segregated schools, extracting money from low-income
communities through excessive municipal fees and fines, and the
perpetual indebtedness of payday loans.
There exist political distinctions between exploitation and
expropriation in addition to the economic distinctions described above.124
In the political realm, a “hierarchical ordering of society” similarly serves
capitalism’s aims.125 Capitalism depends on a status distinction between
free individuals who are “rights bearing” and those who are “subject
peoples, unfree chattel, and dependent members of families and
subordinated groups.”126 Individuals who have the legal status of free
individuals have the right to sell their labor for wages.127 Exploitation is the
mode of capital accumulation used to extract value from these free, rightspossessing individuals.128 Expropriation, by contrast, confiscates value in
the form of “labor, property and/or persons”129 from defenseless groups,
including subject peoples and subordinated groups.130 Nancy Fraser
stresses the importance of the diﬀering political status of these groups,
emphasizing that because subject peoples and subordinated groups lack
adequate protection from the state, they are capable of being expropriated
over and over again.131
Second, race-making practices are central to the capitalist social order
because “capitalism requires inequality and racism enshrines it.”132 The
123. See Burden-Stelley, supra note 66, at 17 (“Labor superexploitation[’s] eﬀects are
so extreme that it pushes racialized, particularly Black, labor eﬀectively below the level of
sheer physical subsistence.”).
124. See Fraser, Expropriation and Exploitation, supra note 119, at 169 (noting that
expropriation and exploitation diﬀer not just economically but also politically and legally).
125. See Fields & Raymond, supra note 82, at 1629.
126. See Fraser, Expropriation and Exploitation, supra note 119, at 169.
127. See id.
128. See Go, supra note 96, at 43.
129. See Fraser, Expropriation and Exploitation, supra note 119, at 169.
130. See Go, supra note 96, at 43–44 (“[E]xpropriation, which includes slavery and
colonialism, extracts value from racialized ‘dependent subjects’ and is what enables exploitation to happen in the first place.”).
131. See Fraser, Expropriation and Exploitation, supra note 119, at 169 (“[E]xploited
workers have the legal status of free individuals . . . . [Thus,] their status diﬀers sharply from
those whose labor, property, and/or persons are still subject to confiscation on the part of
capital; far from enjoying protection, the latter populations are defenseless, fair game for
expropriation—again and again.”).
132. See Go, supra note 96, at 43 (citing Ruth Wilson Gilmore, The Worrying State of the
Anti-Prison Movement, Soc. Just. (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.socialjusticejournal.org/theworrying-state-of-the-anti-prison-movement/ [https://perma.cc/YDT8-T7MH]); see also Jenkins
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process of racialization involves creating “racial” hierarchies of superior
and inferior groups, which are premised on a set of markers, including
ethnicity, language, religion, indigenousness, and culture, as well as
physical characteristics, such as skin color.133 Capitalism, Robinson
explains, is an extension of feudalism’s race-making practices into the
modern world’s political and economic relations.134 Capitalism’s survival
depends on “the elaboration, reproduction and exploitation of racial
diﬀerence,” which produces a lesser, inferior population that is treated as
“surplus, expandable and disposable.”135 Hierarchical racial
diﬀerentiation is intrinsic to capitalism in all its manifestations, extending
from earlier eras of slavery and imperialism, to industrial capitalism, and
including present day financial capitalism.136 Racial capitalism is and has
always been capitalism, not simply a form of capitalism.137
All workers and individuals—Black, brown, white, indigenous, Asian,
and more—are targets of racial capitalism and made available for exploitation and extraction under this system.138 Because work and society are
organized around racialized hierarchies and domination, however, not all
workers and individuals receive equal treatment. Looking back to the
colonial era, for example, the fact that white indentured servants held a
superior social, legal, and political status to Black slaves did not exempt
them from experiencing exploitation in the labor market.139 White workers in the contemporary capitalist system continue to be subjected to
exploitative labor market practices, including stagnant wages, right to
work laws, and the elimination of union protections, and many struggle to
survive. That said, this Essay’s emphasis is primarily on Black communities
that are subject to race-making practices and social caste norms that identify racialized groups as lesser and that subject them to extreme and
relentless forms of extraction.
Third, racial capitalism is “a highly malleable structure” that is
“dynamic and changing” and manifests diﬀerently in diﬀerent times and
contexts.140 As historians Jenkins and Leroy explain:
& Leroy, supra note 96, at 3 (“[R]ace serves as a tool for naturalizing the inequalities produced
by capitalism, and this racialized process of naturalization serves to rationalize the unequal distribution of resources, social power, rights, and privileges.”).
133. See Virdee, supra note 80, at 18–19; see also Gonzalez, Racial Capitalism and the
Anthropocene, supra note 100, at 73.
134. See Burden-Stelley, supra note 66, at 9.
135. See Ida Danewid, The Fire This Time: Grenfell, Racial Capitalism and the
Urbanisation of Empire, 26 Eur. J. Int’l Rels. 289, 297 (2019).
136. See Fields & Raymond, supra note 82, at 1628–29; see also Robin D.G. Kelley, Foreword to Cedric J. Robinson, Black Marxism, at xii–xiii (3d ed. 2020).
137. See Danewid, supra note 135, at 297–98; see also Jodi Melamed, Racial Capitalism,
1 Critical Ethnic Stud. 76, 77 (2015) (“[T]he term ‘racial capitalism’ requires its users to
recognize that capitalism is racial capitalism.”).
138. See Virdee, supra note 80, at 6, 22.
139. See Harris, Whiteness as Property, supra note 57, at 1716–18.
140. See Jenkins & Leroy, supra note 60, at 3, 12.
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[Racial capitalism] has at times relied on open methods of
exploitation and expropriation that wrench racialized
populations into capitalist modes of production and
accumulation, such as slavery, colonialism, and enclosure. But
racial capitalism also relies on exclusion from those same modes
of production and accumulation in the form of containment,
incarceration, abandonment, and underdevelopment for a racial
surplus population. The maintenance of racial capitalism can
even rely on the limited inclusion and participation of racially
marked populations; by extending credit and political rights to
these populations, the pervasive “racial” of racial capitalism
recedes, entrenching itself through obfuscation.141
And, finally, the racial capitalism frame is relevant to sites commonly
understood as nonmarket,142 including state institutions such as public
schools,143 prisons, and, for our purposes, state courts. Racial capitalism
scholars utilize an expanded view of capitalism as an institutionalized
social order, not simply an economic system.144 The racial capitalism frame
explodes the idea that economic and political spheres are separate and
distinct forms of governance where the “economic” is assumed to be a
space where free and equal individuals come together.145 Racial capitalism
insists that this assumption is an ideological obfuscation that, in fact, perpetuates racialized expropriation and exploitation. Further, racial
capitalism is made possible by the state, which operates in tandem with the
market and supplies the “legal framework underpinning private
enterprise and market exchange.”146 For example, in her case study of the
electrical utility, Georgia Utility, and its electrification of Atlanta, Nikki
Luke demonstrates the critical role of the state in allowing energy capital
to extract disproportionate profits from devalued racialized communities,
contributing to debt accumulation, utility shutoﬀs, and pollution
exposure.147 Whether or not we conceive of state institutions as existing
outside the market, states also regularly engage in racialized governing,
profit-making, and predation, and their practices ought to be
problematized.148 More specifically for our purposes, the legal system is
neither neutral nor merely complicit in the operations of racial capitalism.
“In [law’s] capacity as a tool for maintaining ‘order,’” Angela Harris
141. See id. at 3–4.
142. See Harris, Foreword, supra note 6, at xi.
143. See Leong, supra note 91, at 2155 (describing “the premium that privileged segments of American society place upon diversity, both within and beyond institutions of
higher education”); Pierce, supra note 102, at 24 (providing an account of “Du Bois’s caste
analysis of schooling in racial capitalist society”).
144. See Fraser, Expropriation and Exploitation, supra note 119, at 173.
145. See Harris, Foreword, supra note 6, at ix–x.
146. See Fraser, Behind Marx’s Hidden Abode, supra note 120, at 64.
147. See Luke, supra note 89, at 3–9.
148. See, e.g., Bernadette Atuahene, Predatory Cities, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 107, 119–24
(2020) (detailing aspects of a “longer history of state actors using racially biased laws and
policies to construct vulnerability in Detroit and other African-American communities”).
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explains, it has, “in partnership with economics, ruthlessly adopted
commitments that have fostered and protected racial capitalism.”149
B.

A Theory of Racial Capitalism in the Civil Courts

As an arm of the state, the civil courts both enforce and legitimize
racial capitalism. They redistribute assets through a pattern of racialized
extraction and dispossession, thereby growing profit for those with capital.
Through the seizure of assets by force, combined with the threat of force
against those who do not comply, the civil courts impose fear, maintain
social control, and enforce the social order.
Take, for example, eviction courts, in which a disproportionate
number of defendants are Black women150 and the forum functions more
as a vehicle for rent collection than to ferret out facts, interpret the law, or
reach a just outcome.151 Nicole Summers has shown how eviction courts
serve to discipline tenants through settlements that produce a system of
“civil probation.”152 As several social scientists have demonstrated, eviction
courts function primarily to extract wealth, impose fear, and enforce
existing power dynamics.153 One of us has further argued that eviction
courts operate to “enforce the existing social order, specifically the hierarchical relations between landlords and tenants,” which are inextricable
from the racialized assignment of property rights.154 In eviction cases and
beyond, we argue, a primary function of the civil courts is the racialized
production of profit.
The design features of the courts support this system of exploitation.
The largest categories of civil cases—debt collection, eviction, and family
law—fill lower state court dockets, and these courts’ processes share
certain features: speed, lack of evidence, lack of discovery, high rates of
default judgments, the routine absence of legal representation for the vast
majority of defendants, the common presence of legal representation for
select groups (creditors and landlords in particular), and others.155

149. Harris, Foreword, supra note 6, at xiv; see also Virdee, supra note 80, at 9 (“[T]he
state intervenes and comes to serve as stabilizer and enforcer of the capitalist order . . . .”).
150. See supra note 2.
151. See Sabbeth, Eviction Courts, supra note 2, at 396, 401–02; Sudeall & Pasciuti,
supra note 26, at 1368.
152. Nicole Summers, Civil Probation, 75 Stanford L. Rev. (forthcoming 2023)
(manuscript at 3–4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3897493
[https://perma.cc/T2L7-B3SR] [hereinafter Summers, Civil Probation] (relying on an
empirical investigation of 1,000 eviction cases to demonstrate that eviction settlements—
which represent the most common case resolution—constitute a form of financial and
behavioral surveillance akin to criminal probation).
153. Garboden & Rosen, supra note 28, at 640–41; Gomory, supra note 14, at 2.
154. Sabbeth, Eviction Courts, supra note 2, at 368–71, 402–03.
155. See Sabbeth, Eviction Courts, supra note 2, at 376–85; Wilf-Townsend, supra note
1, at 1709–10.
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In Part III, we will draw on examples from one of the most common
civil legal issues litigated in state courts—debt collection—to illustrate the
mechanics of how this operates. But first this subpart presents how the
theoretical framework of racial capitalism sheds light on our
understanding of the civil courts.
1. Racial Commodification. — A primary ingredient of the civil legal system is racial commodification. This includes the translation of people into
monetary values, division of people into categories of racial hierarchy, and
racialized (de)valuation of personhood. Slavery was perhaps the original
commodification of people in the United States.156 Shauna J. Sweeney
explains:
[On slave ships, enslaved people were treated as] numerical
abstractions that filled shipping logs, manifests, and margins as
exchange values . . . . Next, enslaved Africans encountered the
auction block, a site at which value was once again aﬃxed to their
souls, with considerations taken for age, sex, and (dis)ability. The
violence of sale was accompanied by extreme alienation and dislocation as this economic system attempted to wrest commodity
from human form. Race came to function as both a transatlantic
currency and a theology, tethering physiognomy and a belief in
intrinsic diﬀerence to the concept of enslaveability.157
Further, “black women’s wombs were the incubators of capital accumulation,”158 and were regulated as such, with “planter-legislators [who]
looked to enslaved women to enlarge their profits.”159
While slavery epitomized it, systems of racialized valuation and extraction continue today.160 Some scholars have argued that abolition itself did
not yield full freedom but rather legitimized domination in a diﬀerent
form, as a system based on contracts and the illusion of choice; former
slaves were denied access to material resources, so abolition created a
“formal equality” of “white entitlement and black subjection.”161 Sweeney
observes that with abolition Black women’s children lost value, and they
are now treated as “a surplus, disposable population subject to judicial
murder or the slow death of incarceration and poverty.”162
156. Harris, Whiteness as Property, supra note 57, at 1720 (“[T]he critical nature of
social relations under slavery was the commodification of human beings.”).
157. Shauna J. Sweeney, Gendering Racial Capitalism and the Black Heretical Tradition, in Histories of Racial Capitalism, supra note 10, at 53, 59 (footnotes omitted).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 59–60 (describing slave laws that drew on the law of property, rather than of
family lineage, for precedent); Harris, Whiteness as Property, supra note 57, at 1719–20
(explaining that Thomas Jeﬀerson “viewed slaves as economic assets, noting that their value
could be realized more eﬃciently from breeding than from labor”).
160. Jenkins & Leroy, supra note 60, at 3–4 (noting methods of racial capitalism change
over time).
161. Golub, supra note 63 (quoting Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror,
Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America 115–17 (1997)).
162. Sweeney, supra note 157, at 63.
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The civil courts play a fundamental role in that treatment, serving as
state-run sites of racialized commodification. The process of racialized
commodification stamps out the human elements of people’s lives and
replaces them with monetary values.163 In child support cases, for example,
noncustodial fathers, disproportionately Black men, are not even permitted to raise issues related to maintaining relationships with their
children.164 When a Black father attempts to raise such claims, he is shut
down, as the courts in such cases will consider only his obligation to pay
child support, and the father would need to file an entirely separate action
to address access to and custody of his children.165 In this way, Black fathers
are commodified as sources of labor to produce payments instead of
humanized as parents seeking to nurture their children. The courts’
devaluation of Black families also extends to the devaluation of Black children, whose need for their dads’ love and support are hardly served by the
state hunting down and locking up their fathers for failure to pay.166
Child support courts also devalue the custodial parents, usually mothers, in whose name the state purports to pursue payment. If a mother
receives public benefits, she is required as a condition of those benefits to
assign to the state any right to sue for child support and to cooperate with
the state’s eﬀorts to do so.167 This cooperation mandate includes showing
up for and participating in enforcement proceedings, even if the mother
does not want to do so or believes it is contrary to her or her children’s
best interests.168 Rather than balancing the needs of one parent against
those of the other, child support courts involve the government exerting
force on both parents for the purposes of collecting past payments (and
shockingly large amounts of interest on those payments)169 for its own coffers. Whether the plaintiﬀ is a private actor or the state itself, the court
processes commodify and devalue the human beings involved.
To be sure, much of civil law could be said to commodify human
experience in that it translates harms and remedies into monetary terms.
Yet the process of racialized commodification also involves courts’
exploitation and devaluation of the claims of people raced as inferior. This
163. See, e.g., Sabbeth, (Under)Enforcement, supra note 26, at 121–27 (describing how
damage calculations devalue claims based on race, class, and gender biases, and noting in
particular that rent abatements based on “analyzing housing as a contracted-for commodity
fail[] to capture the reality of housing as a place to live”).
164. Tonya L. Brito, Nonmarital Fathers in Family Court, 99 Wash. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 15) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Brito,
Nonmarital Fathers in Family Court].
165. Id.
166. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 436 (2011) (describing a series of jail terms for
failure to pay child support).
167. Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. Kan. L. Rev. 229, 265–67
(2000).
168. Id.
169. Id. See also Tonya L. Brito, The Child Support Debt Bubble, 9 UC Irvine L. Rev.
953, 956–67 (2019).

2022]

RACIAL CAPITALISM IN THE CIVIL COURTS

1271

allows the courts to facilitate the increased accumulation of capital by
those with social and economic power.
2. Accumulation of Capital. — A major function of the civil courts is to
facilitate the routine transfer of assets from individuals, disproportionately
people of color, to white-controlled corporations.170 In Daniel WilfTownsend’s recent empirical analysis of civil court cases, he summarized
his findings as follows:
[A] significant portion of courts’ dockets are dedicated to the
near-automatic processing and granting of the claims of large
corporations . . . . [The courts operate] as a site for private companies to petition the state for permission to redistribute others’
assets to themselves—permission which appears to be granted
frequently without much, if any, scrutiny.171
The corporations accumulating assets through the courts are largely
white-dominated.172 The boards of major corporations are predominantly
white men, and the boards control corporate decisions.173 As for who
benefits from the profits of large corporations, the corporate form
distributes profits not to stakeholders, like employees, but to shareholders
and secondarily, to managers, two groups that are overwhelmingly
white.174
Other than the state, the most frequent plaintiﬀ in the civil courts is
a corporation, and the largest corporations use the courts the most
frequently.175 This bears repeating: Corporations are the social actors that
170. Wilf-Townsend, supra note 1, at 1743, 1750–51.
171. Id.
172. Jenkins & Leroy, supra note 60, at 4 (quoting Neville Alexander, An Illuminating
Moment: Background to the Azanian Manifesto, in Biko Lives!: Contesting the Legacies of
Steve Biko 157 (Andile Mngxitama, Amanda Alexander & Nigel C. Gibson eds., 2008)).
173. Deloitte, Missing Pieces Report: The Board Diversity Census of Women and
Minorities
on
Fortune
500
Boards
35
(6th
ed.
2021),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/center-for-boardeﬀectiveness/missing-pieces-fortune-500-board-diversity-study-6th-edition-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/594W-2WZJ]; Peter Eavis, Board Diversity Increased in 2021. Some Ask
What
Took
So
Long.,
N.Y.
Times
(Jan.
3,
2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/03/business/corporate-board-diversity.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (“With their ability to steer companies’ biggest decisions and
pick key executives, boards wield crucial power in American business and society. They have
long been overwhelmingly white and male.”).
174. See Abbye Atkinson, Commodifying Marginalization, 71 Duke L.J. 773, 823–24
(2022) (“[T]he increasing privatization of public welfare has pitted one vulnerable group
against another . . . . By sending individual workers and pension funds alike into the market
to procure their own retirement security, the state has created a new breed of capitalist . . . .”); Jacob Greenspon, How Big a Problem Is It That a Few Shareholders Own Stock
in So Many Competing Companies?, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Feb. 19, 2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/02/how-big-a-problem-is-it-that-a-few-shareholders-own-stock-in-somany-competing-companies [https://perma.cc/2S25-F2XQ] (noting that large investment
firms, not individuals, control most shares and that ownership is increasingly concentrated
into fewer and fewer hands).
175. Wilf-Townsend, supra note 1, at 1708.
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make the most use of the courts to press claims.176 We highlight the role
of corporations in the courts for three reasons. First, we do so in an eﬀort
to turn the “gaze”177 on not only blackness but also whiteness,178 studying
not only those from whom land and labor are stolen but also those doing
the stealing.
Second, it is notable that the courts serve corporations—nonhuman
instruments constructed to generate profit—more frequently than any
human party seeking to meet human needs. Corporations’ role as the
courts’ biggest private users is particularly interesting in the context of
developing doctrine denying standing to human beings.179
The corporate structure functions to separate corporate activities
from the people who own and control them. The presence of any of those
people in a case before the courts is filtered through the corporate
instrument, depersonalizing the conflict with the humans who appear
before the court. To put a finer point on it, underlying each case is a
conflict over resources, but the corporate form launders the social
relations such that the individuals who benefit never appear, and they can
credibly claim no involvement in the violence perpetrated on their behalf.
This mystification and abstraction is another form of the commodification
of racial capitalism: Just as poor people of color are treated as
commodities, through the corporate structure, the humanity of the

176. See, e.g., Gomory, supra note 14, at 2 (finding that corporate landlords file for
eviction and evict at rates two to three times higher than non-corporate landlords); Rutan
& Desmond, supra note 14, at 71–76 (finding that a small number of landlords were responsible for a significant percentage of all evictions).
177. bell hooks, Black Looks: Race and Representation 122 (2015) (identifying the role
of “oppositional gaze” among practices of resistance to the dominant order); Robtel Neajai
Pailey, De-Centring the ‘White Gaze’ of Development, 51 Dev. & Change 729, 733 (2019)
(highlighting how development literature has assumed a “white gaze” that “measures the
political, socio-economic and cultural processes of Southern black, brown, and other people
of colour . . . and finds them incomplete, wanting, inferior or regressive”); Verónica
Caridad Rabelo, Kathrina J. Robotham & Courtney L. McCluney, “Against a Sharp White
Background”: How Black Women Experience the White Gaze at Work, 28 Gender Work
Org. 1840, 1854–55 (2020) (“By identifying the white gaze as the mechanism by which whiteness manifests and its associated practices, we reverse the gaze—that is, invert it onto
whiteness—to spotlight how racism frames Black women’s everyday work experiences and
illuminate the otherwise invisible role that whiteness assumes in organizations.”).
178. See generally Harris, Whiteness as Property, supra note 57 (examining whiteness
as a form of property and advocating for its delegitimization through aﬃrmative action);
Erika K. Wilson, Monopolizing Whiteness, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 2382 (2021) (analyzing whitestudent segregation through diﬀerent frameworks and arguing for its regulation).
179. See, e.g., TransUnion v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2201, 2214 (2021) (ruling that
plaintiﬀs improperly flagged as potential terrorists and drug traﬃckers lacked standing to
pursue claims against the credit reporting companies). While standing doctrine has taken a
particularly sharp turn, it reflects a longstanding tradition of preventing subordinated people from using the courts to pursue their needs. Recall how Dred Scott was deemed not to
possess the standing to use the courts at all, let alone to bring claims that would grant him
freedom. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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majority-white owners also disappears, and in its place is simply the abstract
pursuit of maximum profit.
A third reason to spotlight the prominence of corporations in the
court system is that it reflects the significance of the profits the courts
generate.180 Wilf-Townsend’s study is particularly useful because, while
most access-to-justice literature concerns itself with what defendants stand
to lose, his paper demonstrates what plaintiﬀs gain.181 To be clear, the civil
courts impose disproportionate burdens according to race, and we want to
underscore that this reality deserves far greater attention, but also we
believe it is vitally important to keep an eye on the significant benefits the
system produces, and for whom. Although the individual cases have been
described as “relatively small-value,”182 in the aggregate, they generate
large sums of money.183 Indeed, money making is their aim.184 To state the
obvious, by law, corporations are entities whose primary if not sole purpose
is to generate profit. Through the courts, the state assists these private
parties in that endeavor.
3. Extraction and Dispossession. — Powerful private actors can use the
courts to transfer and generate wealth because courts engage in racialized
(de)valuation of the parties and claims. To take an example that occurs
daily, even when residences are in shockingly dangerous condition,185
courts evict people for nonpayment of rent without consideration of
whether the obligation to pay was superseded by the owner’s failure to
provide a habitable home.186 As sociologist Matthew Desmond has noted,
180. Jenkins & Leroy, supra note 60, at 7–8 (citing Barbara Fields, Slavery, Race, and
Ideology in United States History, 181 New Left Rev. 95, 115 (1990)) (echoing Fields’ critique of those who focus on slavery as a system of race relations and miss that it was a system
for the generation of huge profits through the production of cotton, sugar, rice, and
tobacco).
181. This point is limited to state courts, as is the scope of this Essay generally. As WilfTownsend observes, in federal courts “these roles are reversed”; federal courts host defendants with far more resources and federal judges create many more obstacles for plaintiﬀs to
overcome. See Wilf-Townsend, supra note 1, at 1711.
182. Id. at 13.
183. See infra section III.B.
184. See Fred Tuomi, Chief Executive Officer, Colony Starwood Homes, Q4 2016 Results –
Earnings Call (Feb. 28, 2017) (transcript available at https://seekingalpha.com/article/4050611colony-starwood-homes-sfr-ceo-fred-tuomi-on-q4-2016-results-earnings-call-transcript)
(describing profits in quarterly earnings phone call).
185. Conditions include toxic mold or lead paint that causes or exacerbates asthma; the
absence of heat or running water necessary to maintain basic hygiene and health; electrical
wiring that results in fires; structural defects that result in broken bones; and other hazardous conditions. See Sabbeth, (Under)Enforcement, supra note 26, at 105.
186. Paula A. Franzese, Abbott Gorin & David J. Guzik, The Implied Warranty of
Habitability Lives: Making Real the Promise of Landlord–Tenant Reform, 69 Rutgers U. L.
Rev. 1, 5 (2016) (describing how infrequently the defense of the warranty of habitability is
raised); Sabbeth, Eviction Courts, supra note 2, at 381 (describing limits on consideration
of substandard conditions); Nicole Summers, The Limits of Good Law: A Study of Housing
Court Outcomes, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev. 145, 194 (2020) (“Tenants with meritorious warranty
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purchasing real estate in poor Black neighborhoods and treating such
properties as cash cows for rent, while allowing them to deteriorate
without maintenance, is a too-common model of exploitation for profit.187
Our point is that this racialized profit model—one that reaps
enormous sums for owners of capital, at the expense of the dignity and
safety of those it exploits—works for those who pursue it because of how the
courts operate.188 Courts reliably assist with extracting profit from these
investments. The civil courts devalue the interests of people of color to
prioritize economic gain over human values.189 Courts treat the inability to
pay rent as a more serious violation of law than refusal to maintain a home
in safe condition.190 This exemplifies how the courts operate as sites of
racialized commodification, dramatically devaluing claims to human life
to pave the way for the right to make a profit.
a. Extraction. — Courts redistribute resources by legitimizing the
extraction of assets from subordinate people. Courts authorize the
collection of financial assets through orders and judgments subject to
enforcement by oﬃcials. They also authorize private parties to engage in
seizure of assets, such as garnishment of wages or bank accounts after
judgment.191 Importantly, the courts provide a quick and cheap
mechanism, making it cost-eﬀective for corporations to pursue thousands
of individuals for small amounts of money that they may not owe.192
The courts also increase the extraction of wealth from subordinated
communities by inflating the amounts that plaintiﬀs can claim. Landlords
list court costs and attorneys’ fees as justifications for inflated amounts.193
claims were statistically just as likely to receive a possessory judgment as tenants without
warranty claims.”).
187. Matthew Desmond, Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City 148–51 (2016); see
also Suzannah Cavanaugh, Bronx Building Where Deadly Fire Occurred Had Faulty Doors, Heat
Issues, RealDeal (Jan. 10, 2022), https://therealdeal.com/2022/01/10/bronx-building-wheredeadly-fire-occurred-had-complaints-of-faulty-door-heat-issues/ [https://perma.cc/UL4K-YXYS]
(noting the roughly twenty-five-million-dollar investment used to purchase a group of buildings
in disrepair and identifying the property’s substandard conditions, which caused the fire deaths
of seventeen people).
188. See, e.g., Sabbeth, Eviction Courts, supra note 2, at 376–85, 395 (describing the law
and culture of eviction courts).
189. See id. at 400; see, e.g., Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 141
S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (holding that the balance of equities did not favor continuing an
eviction moratorium during the COVID-19 pandemic because the possibility of missed or
delayed rent payments constituted “irreparable harm” for landlords and outweighed public
health risks including that of tenant and community deaths).
190. See, e.g., Sabbeth, (Under)Enforcement, supra note 26, at 142–43; Summers, Civil
Probation, supra note 152, at 49.
191. Wilf-Townsend, supra note 1, at 1741–42.
192. Id. at 14–16 (describing debt collection as a “business model centered around litigation, developing highly routinized, low-cost-per-case systems to file complaints, obtain
judgments, and proceed with garnishment” that relies on “a presumption of uninspected
claims”).
193. See, e.g., Tuomi, supra note 184 (noting profits made from such fees).
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In serial eviction proceedings against the same tenant, corporate landlords
repeatedly allege nonpayment and then use the courts to extract not just
rent but also these additional charges.194 The courts thereby assist in
increasing profits for those with capital.
The extraction process in the courts also perpetuates the racialized
subordination of labor.195 Courts sanction patterns of indentured
servitude that structure people’s lives and livelihoods. For too many, rent
takes the majority of their income.196 Subordinated people are literally
killing themselves to earn enough money to pay the rent. They are working
in dangerous jobs, or three jobs.197 They are risking child protection
services going after them for leaving kids unattended.198 They are putting
up with harmful and counterproductive work requirements, invasions of
privacy, and abuse as conditions of public assistance.199 Meanwhile,
194. Garboden & Rosen, supra note 28, at 649 (describing the “[s]tate as a [c]ollection
Agency” for fees); Hepburn et al., supra note 2, at 656 (indicating that people of color are
more likely to be subject to serial evictions); Lillian Leung, Peter Hepburn & Matthew
Desmond, Serial Eviction Filing: Civil Courts, Property Management, and the Threat of Displacement, 100 Soc. Forces 316, 316 (2021) (estimating fees assessed and collected); Sudeall
& Pasciuti, supra note 26, at 1369.
195. See Frederick Cooper, Thomas C. Holt & Rebecca J. Scott, Beyond Slavery: Explorations of Race, Labor and Citizenship in Postemancipation Societies 287 (2000) (noting
that freedom from formal slavery “did not break the association between race and labor,
but in some ways deepened the racialization of the labor question”).
196. See Whitney Airgood-Obrycki, Alexander Hermann & Sophia Wedeen, Joint Ctr.
for
Hous.
Stud.,
The
Rent
Eats
First
1
(2021),
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/research/files/harvard_jchs_rent_eats_f
irst_airgood-obrycki_hermann_wedeen_2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/RX8V-HB6G] (“Even
before the COVID-19 pandemic . . . [n]early a quarter of renter households were spending
more than half of their incomes on rent each month, leaving little income to cover other
expenses.”);
Nat’l
Low
Income
Hous.
Coal.,
Out
of Reach 6 (2021), https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/oor/2021/Out-of-Reach_2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BX9G-LGK8] (“Black and Latino workers face larger gaps between their
wages and the cost of housing than white workers.”).
197. Matthew Desmond, Opinion, The Rent Eats First, Even During a Pandemic, N.Y. Times
(Aug. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/29/opinion/sunday/coronavirusevictions-superspreader.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
198. Roberts, Shattered Bonds, supra note 2, at 36 (“A common ground for neglect is
leaving a child unattended for long enough to endanger the child’s health or welfare . . . .
Yet many poor mothers have had their children taken away by the state when they have left
them alone . . . so that they could keep their jobs.”).
199. Public assistance has always been racialized, gendered, and coercive in the United
States. See Gwendolyn Mink, The Lady and the Tramp: Gender, Race, and the Origins of
the American Welfare State, in Women, the State, and Welfare 92, 93–96 (Linda Gordon
ed., 1990). Recent investigative journalism shows the forms this takes today: In New
Mexico and other states, single mothers applying for public assistance are forced to identify
the father of their child (and his eye color and license plate number) and recall the exact
date when they got pregnant. Eli Hager, The Cruel Failure of Welfare Reform in the
Southwest, ProPublica (Dec. 30, 2021), https://www.propublica.org/article/the-cruelfailure-of-welfare-reform-in-the-southwest [https://perma.cc/XDR2-UZ4K]. In Utah, families seeking aid are subtly pushed to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, where
they’re pressured to get baptized or perform other religious activities, like reading aloud
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unrealistic child support rulings push Black men into substandard,
racialized labor markets.200 Such exploitation of Black communities as
“workers and consumers” has too often been an essential component of
capitalist development.201
Today, through court judgments, and the threat thereof, the state
redistributes income and assets from people lacking material resources to
entities whose purpose is to accumulate such resources for white capital.
b. Dispossession. — Court practices that generate and support the
accumulation of profit rely on the violence of dispossession202—the
confiscation and commandeering of resources and freedoms by force.203
Across the three largest categories of cases in state courts—eviction, debt,
and family law—dispossession is almost universally the express purpose.
What is at stake may be the loss of a home, financial capital, or family ties.
In each case, the plaintiﬀ seeks to take something away from the
defendant, and the state provides tools with which to make that happen.
Racially subordinated people are overrepresented among those whose
homes, finances, and families are compromised, and the vulnerability to
dispossession is itself racialized.
The dispossession goes beyond the material. As K-Sue Park has
observed, “The association of indebtedness with the subordination of
being nonwhite in America appears to have become a lasting American
discursive tradition.”204 So too is the judgment that Black mothers and
fathers are not fit to parent.205 Whether an eviction, debt collection, or
family law decision, judgments also take away and reserve for others the
privileges of a “good” record, which becomes equated with whiteness.206
from the Book of Mormon, in order to get help. Id. And in Arizona, poor moms who could
have benefited from welfare are instead investigated, at nationally unparalleled rates, by a
child services agency funded by welfare dollars. Id.
200. See Noah D. Zatz & Michael A. Stoll, Working to Avoid Incarceration: Jail Threat
and Labor Market Outcomes for Noncustodial Fathers Facing Child Support Enforcement,
6 Russell Sage Found. J. Soc. Sci., at 55, 55–58 (2020).
201. Manning Marable, How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America: Problems in
Race, Political Economy, and Society 61 (3d ed. 2015).
202. See Fields & Raymond, supra note 82, at 1628.
203. See supra section II.A (describing expropriation as “a more extreme and oppressive form of capital expansion that involves the outright theft, confiscation and
commandeering of resources and capacities”).
204. K-Sue Park, supra note 61, at 40.
205. See Dorothy Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers’ Work, in Critical Race Feminism
312, 313–14 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997); Brito, Nonmarital Fathers, supra note 164,
at 9; Molly Schwartz, Do We Need to Abolish Child Protective Services?, Mother Jones (Dec.
10, 2020), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/12/do-we-need-to-abolish-childprotective-services (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“As [caseworker] Sarah reflects
on her experience [working at a child welfare agency], she concludes that the racial disparity in the numbers of children who were removed came from a deep-seated assumption that
many Black parents are incapable of parenting.”).
206. See Harris, Whiteness as Property, supra note 57, at 161–62; Kathryn A. Sabbeth,
Erasing
the
“Scarlet
E”
of
Eviction
Records,
Appeal:
The
Lab
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The judgment that one has failed to pay debts is deemed personal
failure.207 The determination that one is not fit to parent is even worse.208
All of these civil judgments create stigma,209 which then marks the
dispossessed as inferior.
Compounding the injury, the production of stigma is not merely an
accidental byproduct of the court system but a special source of profit.
Credit scores and rental histories, based largely on civil judgments and
eviction filings, are batched and sold as part of a billion-dollar industry that
the civil courts make possible.210 Once marked with the “Scarlet E” of
eviction or bad credit, people are deemed undesirable, dispossessed of
access to housing, education, and other fundamentals of civic life.211
Through these processes of racialized commodification,
dispossession, and extraction, courts facilitate the accumulation of wealth
and perpetuate racial inequality.
III. DEBT COLLECTION, DEFAULTS, AND THE COURTS
The preceding sections have taken a macro view of racial capitalism,
showing how civil courts, purportedly an institution in which private parties litigate contractual and family law disputes, can be viewed instead as
sites of racial capitalism, in which the state and a small group of powerful
capital holders extract and accumulate hard-earned wealth from marginalized communities, dispossess families of their income and assets, and
devalue life sustaining needs such as housing stability, financial security,
and family coherence.
This Part explores civil courts as participants in this endeavor. Courts
have implemented an adjudicatory framework that appears legal in name,
and at least formally in terms of structure, but that, as a practical matter,
provides a means for dominant actors, primarily corporations and other
arms of the state, to strip racialized groups of housing, shelter, wealth, and
(Apr. 12, 2021), https://theappeal.org/the-lab/report/erasing-the-scarlet-e-of-evictionrecords [https://perma.cc/VFU2-HSLP] [hereinafter Sabbeth, Erasing the “Scarlet E”].
207. See Abbye Atkinson, Borrowing Equality, 120 Colum. L. Rev. 1403, 1448–54 (2020)
[hereinafter Atkinson, Borrowing Equality] (describing the social construction of debtors’
subordinated social status); Sabbeth, Prioritization of Criminal Over Civil Counsel, supra
note 45, at 915–16, 916 n.193 (summarizing literature on shame associated with debt); cf.
Louise Seamster, Black Debt, White Debt, 18 Contexts 30, 31–35 (2019) (arguing that “good
debt” and “bad debt” are correlated with race, and Black debt is socially constructed as
“morally stigmatizing,” while white debt can be a positive “status marker”).
208. See Sabbeth, Prioritization of Criminal Over Civil Counsel, supra note 45, at 915,
n.192 (collecting literature).
209. Sabbeth, Prioritization of Criminal Over Civil Counsel, supra note 45, at 915–16.
210. See Sabbeth, Erasing the “Scarlet E” of Eviction Records, supra note 206; Sabbeth,
Prioritization of Criminal Over Civil Counsel, supra note 45, at 915–16.
211. See Sabbeth, Erasing the “Scarlet E” of Eviction Records, supra note 206 (describing how “the dissemination of eviction records pushes already marginalized populations
into substandard . . . markets,” increases housing segregation, and “entrenches
inequality”).
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critical family relationships. In doing so, civil court processes legitimize,
normalize, and perpetuate a centuries-old capitalist racial hierarchy. The
courts’ role is both passive and active in this regard. The pervasive use of
specific practices across thousands of local courts lends credence to the
view that courts are willing to play this role, and that race is a critical
element in determining when, how, and where these frameworks are
enforced.212
The courts utilize a variety of mechanisms that support and maintain
a system of racial capitalism. Courts could conceive of themselves as sites
of protection for basic human rights and racial justice. Instead, they are
highly malleable institutions that capital holders can manipulate to their
advantage. We attribute courts’ perpetuation of racial subjugation to a
devaluation of the lives of marginalized people, a discounting of their
humanity, and a commodification of their basic needs.
While a full examination of the courts’ role in legitimizing racial capitalism is beyond the scope of this Essay, we begin the project of calling
attention to this phenomenon by illuminating one example of how civil
courts perpetuate the racialized pillage of wealth. We rely on the example
of consumer debt collection to demonstrate how destructive court practices infuse the civil legal system and contribute to racial capitalism. Far
from exhaustive, this is but a single illustration of a plethora of court practices, utilized in a wide range of case types, that position civil courts as a
site of racial capitalism. We do not suggest that correction of these practices would suﬃce to reverse courts’ participation in racial subordination;
we intend only to illustrate how courts contribute to this societal problem.
A.

Debt and the Racialization of Debt Delinquency

Debt collection is the cornerstone of the civil legal system. The civil
courts collect many types of debt—rent debt, child support debt, and mortgage debt, among others. The collection of consumer debt, in particular,
accounts for roughly fifteen to thirty percent of civil dockets.213 This poorly
understood sector of the civil courts includes aggressive collection of
healthcare debt, educational debt, credit card debt, and debt taken on to
212. Dantzler, supra note 84, at 126 (“Black neighborhoods are sites of spatial
exploitation where predatory development, segrenomics, and exploitation dominate[].”
(citing Henry Louis Taylor Jr., Disrupting Market-Based Predatory Development: Race,
Class, and the Underdevelopment of Black Neighborhoods in the U.S., 1 J. Race Ethnicity
& City 16, 17 (2020))).
213. Shanahan et al., Institutional Mismatch, supra note 11, at 1495 (analyzing eight
years of data collected by the National Center for State Courts and roughly estimating that
debt collection comprises fifteen percent of civil court dockets); Pew Charitable Trs., How
Debt Collectors Are Transforming the Business of State Courts 1 (2020),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2020/06/debt-collectors-to-consumers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NGZ9-WHFH] [hereinafter Pew Charitable Trs., Debt Collectors]
(reporting that in Texas, the only state maintaining aggregate data on debt collection, these
matters make up thirty percent of the civil caseload).
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meet basic living expenses. To understand how the courts’ role in debt
collection perpetuates racialized harms, it is important to first examine
how race is baked into the process by which debt accumulates and
overwhelms families.
Debt itself is not inherently harmful,214 but as Abbye Atkinson has
argued, the process by which debt becomes delinquent is racialized and
responsible for deepening cycles of racial subjugation.215 Access to credit
has long been lionized as a pathway to financial mobility. Credit creates
opportunities to purchase homes and pursue higher education. For decades, however, the benefits of lending largely accrued to white men. When
credit opportunities opened to Black communities, predatory lending
practices, subprime loans, and structural inequality twisted credit into a
false promise that, instead of opening up access to homes and education,
drowned people in mountains of debt they were unable to repay.216
As Atkinson describes, the extension of credit is beneficial only if the
borrower’s future self has the resources to repay the loan. However, loans
are not divorced from the social context within which they are extended.
Louise Seamster points to core diﬀerences between what she calls “White
debt” and “Black debt.”217 For example, Black consumers are oﬀered
higher-risk financial products and less favorable terms on the same products.218 As a result, “White debt promotes agency and grants
opportunities,” while “Black debt . . . represents the negative balance
sheet that must be worked through just to get to the starting line.”219 In
addition, race-based decisions by private institutions to impose discriminatory interest rates for Black borrowers, or treat their collateral as less
valuable, has meant that “debt burden becomes a means of reverse interpersonal redistribution in which wealth is funneled out of already
vulnerable economic spaces and into the coﬀers of lenders.”220
Debt becomes even more dangerous when it spirals into additional
borrowing to pay back prior loans at escalating interest rates. As Atkinson
shows, Black individuals are targeted for this type of borrowing, with lenders’ business models built on the premise that loans will go unpaid, and
this will permit the extraction of wealth from individuals in delinquency.221
The debt collection process begins when a consumer defaults on
repayment of a loan. In the wake of default, the original creditor or a thirdparty debt buyer pursues collection of the debt, often relentlessly. If
214. Seamster, supra note 207, at 32–33 (2019) (arguing that debt, for white people, is
often an asset and a marker of status).
215. Atkinson, Borrowing Equality, supra note 207, at 1452–53 (2020).
216. Id. at 1439–46.
217. Seamster, supra note 207, at 31.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 32.
220. Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1093, 1104
(2019) [hereinafter Atkinson, Rethinking Credit].
221. Id. at 1101–02.
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unsuccessful, the debt collector may sue the consumer in court. Debt
delinquency, and the threat of litigation, plagues an alarming number of
Americans: nine million borrowers are in default on educational debt222
and twenty-five percent of Americans have medical debt in collections.223
With delinquency comes harassment by debt collectors, exposure of financial woes to one’s employer, negative impact on credit, and court
involvement.224
One illustration of the racialized system of credit-to-default is the payday loan market. Payday loans are loans taken out, typically by low-income
Americans, and disproportionately by Black Americans, to cover basic
human needs such as rent, food, clothing, and other essential items.225 The
loan is due on the date of the borrower’s next paycheck, but more often
than not, the borrower does not have suﬃcient funds to repay the loan
when it comes due.226 Payday loans are intended to cover emergencies, but
according to research by Pew Charitable Trusts, most people use them for
essential recurring expenses such as electricity, running water, and phone
service—what Chrystin Odersma has called “survival debt.”227 These borrowers live in entrenched, often intergenerational, poverty—even though
they work—and are unlikely to transcend their financial circumstances by
the time of their next paycheck.228
Lenders are well aware of this vicious cycle and capitalize on it by
oﬀering payday loan recipients the opportunity to roll over their loans

222. There are forty-five million student loan borrowers who owe 1.7 trillion dollars in educational debt. Zach Friedman, Student Loan Debt Statistics in 2021: A Record $1.7 Trillion,
Forbes (Feb. 20, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2021/02/20/studentloan-debt-statistics-in-2021-a-record-17-trillion/?sh=1e758f814310 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). Approximately twenty percent of these borrowers are delinquent on this debt. Pew
Charitable Trs., Student Loan Default Has Serious Financial Consequences (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2020/04/student-loandefault-has-serious-financial-consequences [https://perma.cc/NL4Q-577H].
223. Nearly fifty percent of Americans carry medical debt, and approximately half of them
are in default. Deb Gordon, 50% of Americans Now Carry Medical Debt, A New Chronic Condition
for
Millions,
Forbes
(Oct.
13,
2021),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/
debgordon/2021/10/13/50-of-americans-now-carry-medical-debt-a-new-chronic-condition-formillions/?sh=13fcc5865e5d (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
224. Paul Kiel & Annie Waldman, Debt Collection Lawsuits Squeeze Black Neighborhoods, ProPublica (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/debt-collectionlawsuits-squeeze-black-neighborhoods [https://perma.cc/DY53-HVWK].
225. Pew Charitable Trs., Payday Lending in America: Who Borrows, Where They
Borrow,
and
Why
11
(2012),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/
uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2012/pewpaydaylendingreportpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/9475DBFG] [hereinafter Pew Charitable Trs., Payday Lending] (finding that Black people are
twice as likely as white people to take out a payday loan).
226. Id. at 5 (reporting that the average payday loan borrower takes out eight loans).
227. Chrystin Odersma, Borrowing Equality: Dispossession and the Need for an Abolitionist Approach to Survival Debt, 120 Colum. L. Rev. Forum 299, 301 (2020).
228. Pew Charitable Trs., Payday Lending, supra note 225, at 13.
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multiple times while interest rates soar into the triple or quadruple digits.229 According to the Center for Responsible Lending, payday lenders
have low losses and high profits, averaging a thirty-four percent return on
their investment despite lending to low-income borrowers.230 Holding a
borrower’s paycheck as collateral gives lenders “strong collateral and leverage over a borrower who, when faced with the threat of criminal
prosecution and penalty fees, will keep paying renewal fees every two weeks
when they cannot aﬀord to repay the loan in full.”231 This race-laden
wealth accumulation rests on the reality that Black people are much more
likely than white people to serve the ranks of the working poor and require
emergency loans on a recurring basis.232 Typically, delinquent debt is sold
to third-party debt buyers on the secondary debt market, providing a cash
infusion for the original lenders. Professional debt collectors, part of a
thirteen-billion-dollar industry,233 specialize in using the courts to initiate
mass collection eﬀorts, often across multiple states at once. All of this
occurs with little intervention from the state. In all likelihood, the societywide devaluation of Black lives has insulated the debt market from proper
regulation or oversight.
B.

Debt Collection in the Courts

Within this setting, in which race plays an inextricable role, civil courts
are inundated with lawsuits seeking recoupment of debt. Courts contend
with millions of debt collection cases a year, with small claims courts now
believed to be the forum of choice for debt collectors.234 As Dalié Jiménez
has detailed, debt buyers who bring suit typically purchase a ledger that
provides little information on the individual account, often nothing more
than the amount of debt allegedly owed.235 As debts are bundled and resold multiple times, information on the amount of the principal, the date
of default, and even the name of the original creditor is often missing.236
Mass lawsuits are brought on the basis of these flimsy ledgers, allowing debt

229. Atkinson, Rethinking Credit, supra note 220, at 1106–07.
230. Fact v. Fiction: The Truth About Payday Lending Industry Claims, Ctr. for Responsible
Lending (Jan. 1, 2001), https://www.responsiblelending.org/research-publication/fact-v-fictiontruth-about-payday-lending-industry-claims [https://perma.cc/QA9M-AQEP].
231. Id.
232. Bureau of Labor Statistics, DOL, Report 1087, A Profile of the Working Poor, 2018,
at 5 (2020), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/working-poor/2018/pdf/home.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L2ZY-GE5Z].
233. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: CFPB Annual
Report 2016, at 8 (2016), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201603_cfpb-fair-debtcollection-practices-act.pdf [https://perma.cc/97NV-B4XV].
234. Hannaford-Agor et al., supra note 12, at v, 17, 33.
235. Dalié Jiménez, Dirty Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, 52 Harv. J. on Legis. 41, 80–81 (2015).
236. Id. at 64–69, 80–81.
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collectors to reap enormous profits from predatory lending practices that
have caused the debt to balloon over a period of months or years.237
Debt collectors could not extract and accumulate wealth without the
courts’ implementation of particular adjudicatory practices. Debt courts
involve a host of highly problematic features. For one, almost all debt
collectors—but virtually no consumers—are represented by counsel.238
Furthermore, some courts show their disregard for power imbalances and
racial inequality in debt matters by setting up “judgeless courtrooms,” in
which consumers are coerced into unsupervised negotiations with debt
buyers and their attorneys.239 In addition, cases are processed rapidly and
judges may handle hundreds of cases in a single day.240
We focus in this section, however, on a particularly pernicious
practice—the mass production of default judgments.241 A default judgment is a judgment entered when the defendant-debtor does not appear
at a scheduled court hearing. Since 2010, the Federal Trade Commission
and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) have exposed
dubious and illegal tactics in collections lawsuits, with debt buyers openly
pursuing meritless debt claims or filing false aﬃdavits in support of their
suits.242 Despite the findings of regulatory agencies, courts award judgments to well over ninety percent of the debt collectors that appear before
them, most of them defaults.243 These default judgments are entered
despite growing evidence that most people sued do not owe the debt

237. Wilf-Townsend, supra note 1, at 1745–46.
238. Steinberg, A Theory of Civil Problem-Solving Courts, supra note 26, at 1596–97.
While lack of representation for consumers is largely the product of constitutional and legislative decisions not to guarantee counsel in civil cases, many trial courts have inherent
authorities to appoint counsel that they rarely invoke. Clare Pastore, A Civil Right to Counsel: Closer to Reality, 42 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 1065, 1076 (2009).
239. Hum. Rts. Watch, Rubber Stamp Justice: US Courts, Debt Buying Corporations, and
the Poor 3–4 (2016), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/us0116_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LAQ3-48Z8].
240. Id.
241. Steinberg, supra note 238, at 1598–1600; see also Sabbeth, Eviction Courts, supra
note 2, at 380–81.
242. Consumer
Fin.
Prot.
Bureau,
Monthly
Complaint
Report:
December
2016,
at
11–13
(2016),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201612_cfpb_MonthlyComplaintReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7FXN-F6N2]; FTC, Repairing a Broken System: Protecting Consumers in
Debt
Collection
Litigation
and
Arbitration,
at
ii
(2010),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureauconsumer-protection-staff-report-repairing-broken-system-protecting/debtcollectionreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U5C4-EL3L].
243. Legal Aid Soc’y, Neighborhood Econ. Dev. Advoc. Project, MFY Legal Servs., Urb.
Just. Ctr. & Cmty. Dev. Project, Debt Deception: How Debt Buyers Abuse the Legal System
to Prey on Lower-Income New Yorkers 1–2 (2010), https://www.neweconomynyc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/08/DEBT_DECEPTION_FINAL_WEB-new-logo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6KXG-QDFJ].

2022]

RACIAL CAPITALISM IN THE CIVIL COURTS

1283

amount named in the lawsuit or may not have received notice of the lawsuit against them.244 In mass-processing defaults, courts enrich billiondollar publicly traded companies earning profits of up to 200 million
dollars a year245 on the backs of poor, racialized groups. Courts enter
default judgments without inquiry into the underlying claim and without
the defendant ever stepping foot into the courtroom.
The example of Chase Bank illustrates the pervasive and uncontrolled
nature of unlawful collections practices and highlights why default judgments are problematic.246 In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Chase
Bank was accused of fraudulent practices in its debt collection lawsuits and
signed a ten-year consent decree that eﬀectively ended its reign of terror
over tens of thousands of credit cardholders. Notably, during the eﬀective
period of the consent decree, Chase Bank pursued far fewer collections
lawsuits, as they were no longer profitable when compliance with due process was required. As soon as the consent decree expired, however, Chase
swiftly resumed its old ways. A ProPublica investigation discovered that, in
2021, Chase began filing mass lawsuits again, relying on only six employees
in an oﬃce in San Antonio to “robo-sign” aﬃdavits vouching for the accuracy of the company’s lawsuits.247 Robo-signing is a common practice in
debt suits involving false attestation of the origins of the debt and its
repurchase, when in fact the employees who sign the aﬃdavits have no
records substantiating the debt and know nothing of who initially owned
it, how interest accrued, or how the debt has been packaged and purchased over time.248
Courts have erected a façade of willful blindness to the tactics of debt
collectors like Chase Bank despite multiple class action lawsuits brought
by the CFPB and various attorneys general against debt buyers over the
past decade.249 The fraudulent practices are not limited to “robo-signing,”
244. Andy
Newman,
They
Need
Legal
Advice
on
Debt.
Should It Have to Come From Lawyers?, N.Y. Times (Jan. 25, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/25/nyregion/consumer-debt-legal-advice.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
245. Paul Kiel & Jeff Ernsthausen, Debt Collectors Have Made a Fortune This Year. Now
They’re Coming for More., ProPublica (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.propublica.org/article/debtcollectors-have-made-a-fortune-this-year-now-theyre-coming-for-more [https://perma.cc/DGP5GF2D].
246. Patrick Rucker, A Return to Robo-Signing: JPMorgan Chase Has Unleashed a Lawsuit
Blitz
on
Credit
Card
Customers,
ProPublica
(Jan.
5,
2022),
https://www.propublica.org/article/a-return-to-robo-signing-jpmorgan-chase-has-unleashed-alawsuit-blitz-on-credit-card-customers [https://perma.cc/5KQQ-DUMD].
247. Id.
248. Lisa Stifler, Debt in the Courts: The Scourge of Abusive Debt Collection and Possible Policy Solutions, 11 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 91, 93, 104–05 (2017).
249. See, e.g., Consent Order, Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, CFPB No. 2015-CFPB0023 (Sept. 8, 2015), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201509_cfpb_consent-orderportfolio-recovery-associates-llc.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DWY-ZS7M]; Consent Order,
Encore
Capital
Grp.,
CFPB
No.
2015-CFPB-0022
(Sept. 3, 2015), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201509_cfpb_consent-order-encore-
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but also include, among other tactics, “sewer service,” in which debt buyers
hire process servers who sign sworn statements that personal service was
achieved, when in fact it was never attempted.250 Despite this type of fraud,
civil courts issue heaps of default judgments in favor of debt collectors,
obliterating financial security for vulnerable families.
Default judgments represent a close form of collusion between corporate interests and the courts. Notably, defaults are unique to the civil
courts. The criminal legal system produces a host of troubling outcomes,
but the concept of default does not exist in criminal courts. It would be
unthinkable for a prosecutor to “win” a case and send the defendant to
prison simply because the defendant did not appear at his hearing. Civil
courts, however, have turned default judgments into a routine way of
conducting business. Defaults resolve somewhere between sixty and ninety
percent of debt cases, but they are not limited to debt matters.251 Default
judgments are also entered in as many as fifty percent of eviction cases.252
Families can lose their homes by default in a week, flung into homelessness
by a sheriﬀ who, backed by a court order, throws their belongings into the
street—sometimes with young children observing the traumatic
experience.
The extraction of wealth from racialized communities is made possible by the courts’ systemic use of default judgments. These judgments are
diﬃcult to undo, rendering them essentially permanent even if a consumer later notifies the court that she did not receive notice of the lawsuit
or that her due process rights were otherwise violated. In addition, default
judgments arm debt collectors with a host of tools that can be used to
accumulate capital and further harm already-poor communities.253 With
the default judgment, the court assigns to the debt collector the right to
reclaim the debt through multiple legal avenues. As indebtedness is inherently racialized, these harms are overwhelmingly imposed on communities
of color. To satisfy a default judgment, a single Black mother might lose
her car pursuant to an order for asset seizure, or she might experience
garnishment of her wages—and continue to be subjected to this
garnishment week after week until the debt is fully satisfied. These court-

capital-group.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JVQ-VVU5]; Press Release, Andrew Cuomo, N.Y.
State Att’y Gen., The New York State Attorney General Andrew M. Cuomo Announces Guilty
Plea of Process Server Company Owner Who Denied Thousands of New Yorkers Their Day
in Court (Jan. 15, 2010), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/new-york-state-attorney-generalandrew-m-cuomo-announces-guilty-plea-process-server [https://perma.cc/5MRR-J58F].
250. Hum. Rts. Watch, supra note 239, at 36–38.
251. FTC, supra note 242, at 7.
252. William E. Morris Inst. for Just., Injustice in No Time: The Experience of Tenants in
Maricopa County Justice Courts 8 n.22 (2005), https://morrisinstituteforjustice.org/helpfulinformation/landlord-and-tenant/4-final-eviction-report/file [https://perma.cc/P3RL-RSCP];
Sabbeth, Eviction Courts, supra note 2, at 380–81 (describing how eviction courts rely on high
default rates to speed through large dockets).
253. Pew Charitable Trs., Debt Collectors, supra note 213, at 18.
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backed collection eﬀorts can persist for years, with snowballing consequences. The mother who loses her car may also lose her job if she has no
transportation to get to work. Garnishment of wages may make it even
more diﬃcult for this mother to feed or clothe her children, which may
force her to take out a payday loan, starting the cycle anew, and contributing to the rapid and exponential growth of debt delinquency, and
ultimately, more civil legal involvement.
Civil courts are admittedly overwhelmed by the volume of case filings.254 And it is clear that the rules of civil procedure permit courts to
enter default judgments when a person fails to appear at a hearing.255
Courts are arguably functioning in accordance with the rule of law, and
this complicates the critique of their institutional role as partners in racial
capitalism. Nonetheless, courts have special authority to legitimize or
repudiate injustices, and their practices, especially when viewed at a macro
level, empower the debt industry with a cheap and easy means of extracting wealth from poor, predominately Black communities. This
legitimizing role distorts the democratic function of courts and instead
places courts in the position of enforcing racially hierarchical relationships and normalizing the racialized accumulation of capital by powerful
corporate interests. Courts cannot solve racial inequality on their own, but
nor should they facilitate extraction.
This depiction of mass adjudication by default judgment may appear
to imply that eliminating the practice of default judgments and requiring
judges to scrutinize claims would absolve the courts of their role in racial
capitalism. That is not the case. Courts are intimately connected to systems
of racial and social control in ways that are diﬃcult, if not impossible, to
undo. Default judgments are but one expression of the depth of courts’
involvement in systems of racial subordination. In providing this illustration of the courts and their relationship to racial capitalism, we do not
intend to suggest a solution but rather to illuminate one example of how
civil courts enforce and perpetuate racial hierarchies in much the same
way that criminal courts do.
CONCLUSION
By engaging in the practices described above—and many others not
touched upon in this Essay—civil courts are both passive participants and
active perpetrators in a system of racial capitalism. In some ways, through
a formalist approach to decisionmaking, they might be seen as merely
facilitating exploitative and oppressive social and economic dynamics with
roots far beyond the judicial system. To end the story there, however,
diminishes the importance of the courts’ role, the agency courts have in
254. Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts., Problems and Recommendations for High-Volume Dockets 2, https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/25721/ncsc-cji-appendices-i.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JUL2-4YZU] (last visited Mar. 26, 2022).
255. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 55.
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allowing those dynamics to flourish, and the power courts wield as an arm
of the state. Civil courts have developed unique processes and procedures
that facilitate racial capitalism and have chosen not to actively identify, let
alone root out, the racial dynamics influencing their operation. Thus, they
are not neutral bystanders, but supporters in maintaining the racialized
systems on which capitalism relies. Similarly, race is not merely an external
factor that inevitably colors the results of the civil court system but is
integral to its design and operation—as well as to our collective national
tolerance of state civil courts operating as sites of injustice and oppression.
With this Essay, we hope to contribute to a much broader conversation
about the role that civil courts play in incorporating, facilitating, and
perpetuating racial inequality.

